Crude Oil Price Quotes

One day, Carmona had an idea. Axcom had been employing various approaches to using their pricing data to trade, including relying on breakout signals. They also used simple linear regressions, a basic forecasting tool relied upon by many investors that analyzes the relationships between two sets of data or variables under the assumption those relationships will remain linear. Plot crude-oil prices on the x-axis and the price of gasoline on the y-axis, place a straight regression line through the points on the graph, extend that line, and you usually can do a pretty good job predicting prices at the pump for a given level of oil price.

The new GST: A halfway house In spite of all the favourable features of the GST, it introduces the anomaly of having an origin-based tax on interstate trade he proposed GST would be a single levy. 1141 words From a roadblock during the UPA regime, the incessant efforts of the BJP government have finally paved way for the introduction of the goods and services tax (GST). This would, no doubt, be a major reform in the existing indirect tax system of the country. With a view to introducing the GST, Union finance minister Arun Jaitley has introduced the Constitution (122nd Amendment) Bill 2014 in Parliament. The new tax would be implemented from April 1, 2016. Both the government and the taxpayers will have enough time to understand the implications of the new tax and its administrative nuances. Unlike the 119th Amendment Bill, which lapsed with the dissolution of the previous Lok Sabha, the new Bill will hopefully see the light of the day as it takes into account the objections of the state governments regarding buoyancy of the tax and the autonomy of the states. It proposes setting up of the GST Council, which will be a joint forum of the Centre and the states. This council would function under the chairmanship of the Union finance minister with all the state finance ministers as its members. It will make recommendations to the Union and the states on the taxes, cesses and surcharges levied by the Union, the states and the local bodies, which may be subsumed in the GST; the rates including floor rates with bands of goods and services tax; any special rate or rates for a specified period to raise additional resources during any natural calamity or disaster etc. However, all the recommendations will have to be supported by not less than three-fourth of the weighted votes—the Centre having one-third votes and the states having two-third votes. Thus, no change can be implemented without the consent of both the Centre and the states. The proposed GST would be a single levy. It would aim at creating an integrated national market for goods and services by replacing the plethora of indirect taxes levied by the Centre and the states. While central taxes to be subsumed include central excise duty (CenVAT), additional excise duties, service tax, additional customs duty (CVD) and special additional duty of customs (SAD), the state taxes that fall in this category include VAT/sales tax, entertainment tax, octroi, entry tax, purchase tax and luxury tax. Therefore, all taxes on goods and services, except alcoholic liquor for human consumption, will be brought under the purview of the GST. Irrespective of whether we currently levy GST on these items or not, it is important to bring these items under the Constitution Amendment Bill because the exclusion of these items from the GST does not provide any flexibility to levy GST on these items in the future. Any change in the future would then require another Constitutional Amendment. From a futuristic approach, it is prudent not to confine the scope of the tax under the bindings of the Constitution. The Constitution should demarcate the broad areas of taxing powers as has been the case with sales tax and Union excise duty in the past. Currently, the rationale of exclusion of these commodities from the purview of the GST is solely based on revenue considerations. No other considerations of tax policy or tax administration have gone into excluding petroleum products from the purview of the GST. However, the long-term perspective of a rational tax policy for the GST shows that, at present, these taxes constitute more than half of the retail prices of motor fuel. In a scenario where motor fuel prices are deregulated, the taxation policy would have to be flexible and linked to the global crude oil prices to ensure that prices are held stable and less pressure exerted on the economy during the increasing price trends. The trend of taxation of motor fuel all over the world suggests that these items

With the price of US crude below $60 per barrel — down 46 per cent from six months ago — some operators plan to mothball their stripper wells. Widespread closures could help balance the oversupplied global oil market and stabilise prices. Melvin Moran, whose company owns stripper wells in Oklahoma, said it costs thousands of dollars a year to keep one pumping. “A lot of the wells we operate are not going to be viable at this price. I’m not talking about drilling, but just getting the oil from below the ground to the surface of the ground.” Mark Thomas has two companies operating 100 stripper wells in Arkansas state with total production of 300 b/d. “Some of those will be shut in, probably within 90 days,” he said last week.

The halving of crude prices since the summer has brought US and eurozone inflation below zero. Prices in Britain are rising at the slowest rate in decades. Even in Japan, where a programme of quantitative easing had succeeded in pushing up inflation, price pressures have come down sharply compared with last spring. But despite pessimists’ predictions, there is little evidence of a negative spiral of falling prices and weak demand tainting the world economy. Indeed, in January, annual retail sales in the world’s most advanced economies rose at their most rapid pace since 2006 according to Capital Economics, a consultancy. Sliding oil prices have put $250bn in the pockets of consumers in the world’s four largest economies and shoppers seem determined to spend it.

Andrew Hall may be positioning himself now for the next coming boom cycle, but the market will need more than the predictions of some good traders to turn around. One thing that absolutely must happen is a real and measurable leveling off of production here in the U.S. Early in the bust phase for shale, with crude prices, budgets, and rig counts collapsing, I was of the opinion that indeed, production cuts would come a whole lot sooner than either the EIA or most of the bank analysts believed was possible. But I’ve been impressed by the free flow of capital that has come in to the markets looking to ‘save’ shale oil companies from their excesses, and slowing what I thought would be a violent progression of bond defaults and outright bankruptcies. In a recent note on the state of E+P, Morgan Stanley also noted the trend, when one of its analysts, Evan Calio, wrote: “Secondary offerings have been positively received by investors as a means to shore up balance sheets and pre-fund drilling programs in light of falling crude prices. Secondary offerings remain a logical way to delever [a financial term meaning to reduce debt], but also has the potential to extend the trough rather than hasten its arrival.” (emphasis mine). In other words, there is too much money still chasing oil for a quick weeding out of the weaklings. We might see a longer period of ‘survivability’ before the real wall hits.

Socialist historian Gabriel Kolko, who argues in The Triumph of Conservatism that the forces of competition in the free market of the late 1800s were too potent to allow Standard to cheat the public, stresses that “Standard treated the consumer with deference. Crude and refined oil prices for consumers declined during the period Standard exercised greatest control of the industry.” Standard

The result is that CEOs are often rewarded for pure luck; when the stock market valuation of the firm goes up, even if it is due to pure chance (e.g., world crude oil prices went up, the exchange rate moved in the firm’s favor), their salary increases. The one exception, which in some ways proves the rule, is that CEOs of companies where there is a single large shareholder who sits on the board (and is vigilant because it is his own money on the line) get paid significantly less for luck than for genuinely productive management.56

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the three major sectors (electricity, transportation, and industry) all produce comparable emissions. But they’d be affected very differently by an economy-wide carbon price. For example, coal fueled about one-quarter of US electricity in 2019, and each metric ton of that coal was sold for about $39.7 A carbon price of $40 for each ton of CO2 emitted would effectively double that cost to power plant operators and so be a strong inducement for them to forswear coal. In contrast, that same carbon price would increase the effective price of crude oil by only about 40 percent above $60 per barrel. And if that cost were passed through to the pump, gasoline would increase by only some $0.35 per gallon. Since that’s small compared to how much pump prices have varied historically, consumers wouldn’t have much incentive to move away from gasoline. So reductions in emissions from power (and, as it turns out, heat) are much easier to encourage than reductions from transportation, fundamentally because oil packs a lot more energy per carbon atom than does coal.

day to the news that the economy is back on track only to discover that there is less oil supply at our disposal than there was when demand started to fall. And it won’t be just the one-two punch of reviving demand and sagging supply that pushes prices up in a hurry. Once the genie of inflation is out of the bottle, it is going to take oil prices on a ride along with everything else. For one thing, there will be more money chasing fewer barrels in the world so the price will go up. And the dollars chasing that oil are going to be worth less and less even as the oil gets more valuable. Remember the Argentine peso and its 20,000 percent inflation rate? If a barrel of crude had been denominated in pesos, oil would have gone up 20,000 percent in 1989–90. If the United States wants to reflate its way out of recession, it is going to pump up the price everybody in the world pays for oil, since everybody pays in US dollars. If the dollar is worth less, oil is going to be worth that much more.

Low kerosene prices, a boon to consumers, were catastrophic for refiners, who saw the profit margin between crude- and refined-oil prices shrink to a vanishing point.

We have known, long before this cure was discovered, that we have been consuming resources at an unsustainable pace- a pace that will now quicken at an unimaginable rate. We are a nation of strong, hardworking people. But it is, I'm afraid, part of human nature that we adapt only when forced to. We are told that there is only so much crude oil left in the earth. Yet we can still buy gas at the station on the corner, and for a relatively decent price. We haven't changed our ways, because we don't feel we have to. (p.67)

Perversely, the most enduring consequence of the 1970s belief that energy supplies were running out was not to use less, but to look for more. In this quest, Jimmy Carter, arguably the most ecologically minded president in U.S. history, endorsed policies that today seem like environmental folly. Notably, his administration sought to offset the approaching decline of oil and gas by tripling the use of coal, a much dirtier fuel. Just as peak oil had provided justification for foreign-policy misadventures in the 1920s and 1930s, it proved a friend to Big Coal in the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, oil firms found so much crude that by the end of the 1990s real prices had fallen to half—sometimes a fifth—of what they were during Carter’s day.

Spindletop not only created the modern American oil industry, it changed the way the world used oil. Its dirty little secret was that the oil found around Beaumont was of such poor quality it could not be refined into kerosene. But it made fine fuel oil—and that’s what changed everything. So much black crude flowed from Beaumont that oil prices dropped to three cents a barrel—a cup of water cost five cents—making it economical for railroads and steamship companies to convert from coal to oil.

In other words, no matter what country you buy your oil from, Saudi Arabia determines world price by how much oil it chooses to produce.

In Venezuela the price people pay for a dollar depends on who they are and what they do for a living. Venezuela’s leftist government sold dollars for 6.3 bolivars to an elite few.

Put a price limit on any good, and chances are that increased demand will eventually make it scarce—dollars are no exception. The government’s dollar auctions are met with insatiable demand. Think of the free-for-all one sees on television when aid workers deliver food to a starved African community. People run over themselves for a share of what’s being given. The fast-rising price of the dollar in the black market is an indication of this madness.

In the eyes of the government, there are three types of enemies: companies that intentionally produce less toilet paper, distributors who hoard the paper rolls hoping to sell them to desperate consumers for higher prices, and misguided Venezuelans who buy more rolls than they should. As far as the government is concerned, the mark of a revolutionary Venezuelan is to stoically wait and endure toilet tissue shortages while politicians work to erect a socialist system with the country’s oil wealth.

As León sees it, price controls and the resulting bachaquero class “have built a system of economic redistribution from richer Venezuelans to the poor.

Stringent regulations as well as price and capital controls cause many companies to lose money and, as such, make companies more dependent on the government’s good graces to stay in business.

Oil that was drilled in Texas or Saudi Arabia, by contrast, was known as “sweet” crude because it had very low sulfur content. This made it a lot cheaper and easier to process—you didn’t need coker towers to take the sulfur out. So many of America’s oil refineries sprang up around the Gulf Coast because that’s where sweet crude was imported and processed. Very few firms wanted to install the kind of expensive equipment that ran at Pine Bend, but Great Northern had done so. When Paulson took over, Pine Bend was one of very fewer buyers in the upper Midwest that offered to buy Canadian crude. Because there were so few buyers, the Canadian crude piled up—there was an excess of supply. This meant that prices dropped. Koch could buy the sour oil at a price that was significantly lower than oil prices elsewhere in the United States. But the cheap Canadian crude was only half of the equation. When Koch turned around to sell the gasoline it made at Pine Bend, it sold that gasoline into a midwestern region where there were very few other refineries, causing supplies to be relatively tight and prices high. This made the economics of Pine Bend almost too good to be true.

Oil imports nearly tripled between 1967 and 1973. With US demand for imports so strong, there was virtually no cushion of extra oil supplies on global markets to help absorb a shock to supplies. The Arab embargo kept about 4.4 million barrels of oil a day off the market: 9 percent of the total supply. For the first time in its history, the United States could not make up for the loss. The shock was unprecedented. Gasoline prices, which had hovered along at the same level year after year for decades, spiked. In some markets, crude oil prices jumped from $5.40 a barrel to $17 a barrel—a 600 percent increase in a matter of weeks.

In the futures markets, they bought and sold paper contracts. Futures contracts had been around for more than a century and were an integral part of the food system. Corn, pork, and soybean futures were traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. The NYMEX specialized in eggs and butter. The futures market wasn’t big—traders in the market tended to be farmers and big grain millers. They used futures contracts to limit their risk. The owners of the NYMEX weren’t content with their sleepy corner of the financial world, and they decided to expand their business and sell contracts for new kinds of products. The NYMEX introduced the first futures contract for crude oil in 1983. At first, the birth of oil futures contracts looked like a threat to Koch’s business model. Howell and his team spent years figuring out how to be the smartest blind men in the dark cave of the physical oil business and making the best guess as to the real price of oil. Koch Industries had gained an expertise in exploiting the opacity of oil markets and wringing the best price out of its counterparties. The new oil futures contract created something that was anathema to this business model: transparency. When the NYMEX debuted its oil futures contract, it created a very visible price for crude oil that changed by the minute on a public exchange. Again, this wasn’t the price of real crude; it was the price for a futures contract on crude, reflecting the best guess of all market participants as to what a barrel of oil would be worth in the future. Even though the futures price wasn’t the real price, it provided everybody with a common reference point. Now, when Koch called up someone to buy oil from Koch’s tank farm in St. James, that customer could look at a screen and start haggling based on what the markets in New York were saying the price of oil was worth. “It was the first time that there was a common, visible market signal,” Howell said. “It just kind of sucked the oxygen out of the room for that physical trading.

It’s difficult for outsiders to even understand the nature of a contango market. In essence, the price of oil in spot markets, which reflect the price of oil today, tends to be lower than the price of oil to be delivered in the future. This is attributable to a host of complex reasons.I In the relatively rare scenario when oil today is cheaper than oil in the future, the markets are said to be in contango, and it doesn’t tend to last very long. Usually the market reverts to its normal state of cheaper oil in the future. When the market goes into contango, it presents a whole host of ways for Koch’s traders to profit. In late 2008, the potential profits were extraordinary. The size of the contango became enormous—the gap between oil sold today and oil sold for delivery a few months out became roughly $8 a barrel. A more common level of contango would be in the range of $2 or $4 a barrel. And the gap wasn’t just wide, it was long-lasting. The markets remained in contango for several months. Koch Industries, and a handful of other giant oil producers, were able to exploit this gap in a special way. Because Koch Industries traded in both the futures markets and the physical markets, it could execute something called the “contango storage play.” One former senior trader within Koch Supply & Trading called the contango storage play a “bread-and-butter” strategy for Koch’s crude oil department. The mechanics of the contango storage play seem deceptively simple. A trader at Koch Industries buys oil in the spot markets, where it is cheap. Then, the trader sells oil for delivery in the futures markets, where oil is more expensive. When the contango gap is $8, it is easy to picture how quickly the profits pile up. The trader can buy oil for $35 and sell it for $43, almost instantly. There is a catch, however. To execute the contango storage play, the trader must be able to do something that most traders can’t do—they must be able to deliver the actual, physical oil in that future month. If a typical oil speculator—who did not own an oil refinery, storage tanks, or an oil tanker ship—tried to execute the contango storage trade, they could find themselves shut out. Executing the contango storage trade didn’t just require deep knowledge of arcane shipping markets and transportation law; it also required deep relationships in the private world of oil production.