China Syndrome Quotes

We've searched our database for all the quotes and captions related to China Syndrome. Here they are! All 19 of them:

the China Syndrome.
Adam Higginbotham (Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World's Greatest Nuclear Disaster)
CHINA SYNDROME China is great. China is BIG. China is FUN. And it's hugely frustrating to know that even if I dedicated the rest of my life to the project, I'd never see all of it. There's little question in my mind that as China continues to emerge as an economic superpower, and as we find ourselves increasingly dependent on its manufacturing—and its credit line—that it will eventually pretty much rule the world. To which I say, "Welcome to our future masters!" With China as our landlord, we will, at least, be eating a hell of a lot better.
Anthony Bourdain (The Nasty Bits: Collected Varietal Cuts, Usable Trim, Scraps, and Bones)
They call it Second Lifetime Syndrome, and it happens when a sorcerer watches her family and friends age and die around her. - China
Derek Landy (Last Stand of Dead Men (Skulduggery Pleasant, #8))
there was an outbreak in China of a virus that caused a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Walter Isaacson (The Code Breaker)
Traditionally, young Chinese couples moved in with the groom’s parents, but by the twenty-first century less than half of them stayed very long, and the economists Shang-Jin Wei and Xiaobo Zhang discovered that parents with sons were building ever larger and more expensive houses for their offspring, to attract better matches—a real estate phenomenon that became known as the “mother-in-law syndrome.” Newspapers encouraged it with headlines such as A HOUSE IS MAN’S DIGNITY. In some villages, a real estate arms race began, as families sought to outdo one another by building extra floors, which sat empty until they could afford to furnish them. Between 2003 and 2011, home prices in Beijing, Shanghai, and other big cities rose by up to 800 percent.
Evan Osnos (Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China)
Researchers interviewed nearly 150 thousand people in 26 countries to determine the prevalence of generalized anxiety disorder to find, had excessive and uncontrollable worry adversely affected their life. They found that richer countries had higher rates of anxiety than poor ones. The authors wrote, "The disorder is significantly more prevalent and impairing in high income countries than in low or middle income countries." The number of new cases of depression world-wide increased 50% between 1990 and 2017. The highest increases in new cases were seen in countries with the highest sociodemographic index income, especially North America. Physical pain too is increasing. Over the course of my career, I have seen more patients, including otherwise healthy young people presenting with full-bodied pain despite the absence of any identifiable disease or tissue injury. The numbers and types of unexplained physical pain syndromes have grown. Complex regional pain syndrome, fibromyalgia... [], and so on. When researchers ask the following question to people in 30 countries around the world. "During the past four weeks, how often have you had bodily aches or pains"...[]. They found that Americans reported more pain than any other country. 34% of Americans said they experienced pain often or very often, compared to 19% of people living in China, 18% of people living in Japan, 13% of people living in Switzerland, and 11% of people living in South Africa. The question is, "Why in an unprecedented time of wealth, freedom, technological progress, and medical advancement, do we appear to be unhappier and in more pain than ever?'. The reason we're all so miserable may be because we're working so hard to avoid being miserable.
Anna Lembke (Dopamine Nation: Finding Balance in the Age of Indulgence)
British colonial disdain for human rights even left its mark on the English language. The word “coolie” was borrowed from a Chinese word that literally means “bitter labor.” The Romanized first syllable coo means “bitter” and the second syllable lie mimics the pronunciation of the Chinese logograph that means “labor.” This Chinese word sprang into existence shortly after the Opium War in the nineteenth century when Britain annexed several territories along the eastern seaboard of China. Those territories included Hong Kong, parts of Shanghai, Canton city (Guangzhou) and parts of Tianjin, a seaport near Beijing. In those newly acquired territories, the British employed a vast number of manual laborers who served as beasts of burden on the waterfront in factories and at train stations. The coolies’ compensation was opium, not money. The British agency and officers that conceived this unusual scheme of compensation—opium for back-breaking hard labor—were as pernicious and ruthless as they were clever and calculating. Opium is a palliative drug. An addict becomes docile and inured to pain. He has no appetite and only craves the next fix. In the British colonies and concessions, the colonizers, by paying opium to the laborers for their long hours of inhumane, harsh labor, created a situation in which the Chinese laborers toiled obediently and never complained about the excessive workload or the physical devastation. Most important of all, the practice cost the employers next to nothing to feed and house the laborers, since opium suppressed the appetite of the addicts and made them oblivious to pain and discomfort. What could be better or more expedient for the British colonialists whose goal was to make a quick fortune? They had invented the most efficient and effective way to accumulate capital at a negligible cost in a colony. The only consequence was the loss of lives among the colonial subjects—an irrelevant issue to the colonialists. In addition to the advantages of this colonial practice, the British paid a pittance for the opium. In those days, opium was mostly produced in another British colony, Burma, not far from China. The exploitation of farmhands in one colony lubricated the wheels of commerce in another colony. On average, a coolie survived only a few months of the grim regime of harsh labor and opium addiction. Towards the end, as his body began to break down from malnutrition and overexertion, he was prone to cardiac arrest and sudden death. If, before his death, a coolie stumbled and hurt his back or broke a limb, he became unemployed. The employer simply recruited a replacement. The death of coolies in Canton, Hong Kong, Shanghai and other coastal cities where the British had established their extraterritorial jurisdiction during the late 19th century was so common that the Chinese accepted the phenomenon as a routine matter of semi-colonial life. Neither injury nor death of a coolie triggered any compensation to his family. The impoverished Chinese accepted injury and sudden death as part of the occupational hazard of a coolie, the “bitter labor.” “Bitter” because the labor and the opium sucked the life out of a laborer in a short span of time. Once, a 19th-century British colonial officer, commenting on the sudden death syndrome among the coolies, remarked casually in his Queen’s English, “Yes, it is unfortunate, but the coolies are Chinese, and by God, there are so many of them.” Today, the word “coolie” remains in the English language, designating an over-exploited or abused unskilled laborer.
Charles N. Li (The Turbulent Sea: Passage to a New World)
said that they “collapsed,” but in fact they were overthrown). This seminal event produced what China scholar Richard Baum described as “post-Soviet traumatic stress syndrome” for the CCP leadership and Party.14 However, following the initial shock, the CCP under Jiang Zemin’s leadership (and directed by his right-hand man Zeng Qinghong) undertook probably one of the most important acts in its history: a systematic and thorough post-mortem analysis of the causes of the fall of the USSR and other East European communist party-states. Many—if not all—of the political actions and reforms undertaken on Jiang Zemin’s watch derived
David Shambaugh (China's Leaders: From Mao to Now)
I wake up every day thinking: Is this the day the proxy wars have resulted in a nuclear catastrophe?
Steven Magee
Summary of COVID-24: SARS-CoV-3 is an infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 3. Common symptoms include fever, sweating, sneezing, coughing, sporadic nerve pain across the extremities and fatigue. While we are still in the early stages of understanding this virus, most cases identified to date have resulted in mild symptoms that appear to resolve themselves without the need for medical intervention. However, an unknown percentage of people infected have experienced acute respiratory distress syndrome, requiring medical intervention. In China, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, there have been reports of some patients suffering from multiple organ failure, to include septic shock. At this present time, we are unable to determine how contagious the virus is or its incubation period. Until more of this information can be identified, the CDC recommends issuing a level 2 travel advisory for China, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
James Rosone (Monroe Doctrine: Volume I (Monroe Doctrine, #1))
Thermal hazard: sometimes called the China Syndrome, also caused fear and anxiety. This name, taken from the 1979 film of the same name, means that nuclear fuel, which gets hot because of residual afterheat, starts to burn through the floors of a reactor’s buildings one by one, going down until it reaches underground waters and contaminates them. And last, radioactive hazard: it was there, growing every hour. With every release of smoke, radioactivity contaminated more and more territories.
Alexander Borovoi (My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe)
Readers of this book will not encounter discussions of the Middle Kingdom Syndrome, China’s concept of tianxia (“all under heaven”), imperial China’s tributary system, or strategizing as reflected by the board game wei ch’i. These ideas are not entirely irrelevant to China’s contemporary international relations, but these references serve more the purpose of conjuring up some cultural disposition without explicating the interpretive logic necessary to show the usefulness or validity of the suggested extrapolation. It is about as useful as invoking Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine, the idea of Fortress America, the analogy of American football, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s treatise on sea power, and even Thucydides’s history of the Peloponnesian War to illuminate current U.S. foreign policy. Any country with a long history and a rich culture, including China, offers contested ideas and competing, even divergent, doctrines and schools of thought. Indeed, strategic thoughts often embody bimodal injunctions, such as to be cautious and audacious, confident and vigilant, uncompromising and flexible, optimistic about eventual victory and realistic about short-term set back (Bobrow 1965, 1969; Bobrow, Chan, and Kringen 1979). Chinese diplomatic discourse and military treatises feature both lofty Confucian rhetoric on the efficacy of moral suasion and hard-nosed, realpolitik recognition of military coercion (Feng 2007; Johnston 1995)— just as contemporary analyses of and pronouncements about U.S. policies often incorporate both liberal and realist themes and arguments. Such elements can coexist.
Steve Chan (Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia (Studies in Asian Security))
(In 2003 a new coronavirus that causes SARS, “severe acute respiratory syndrome,” appeared in China and quickly spread around the world. Coronaviruses cause an estimated 15 to 30 percent of all colds and, like the influenza virus, infect epithelial cells. When the coronavirus that causes SARS does kill, it often kills through ARDS, although since the virus replicates much more slowly than influenza, death from ARDS can come several weeks after the first symptoms.)
John M. Barry (The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History)
First, they threw materials containing boron. These were to prevent spontaneous chain reactions, because boron is one of the most effective neutron absorbers. Putting some dozens of kilograms of boron into a working reactor is enough to stop its nuclear reaction forever. But during the first days after the accident, they threw about forty tons of boron-containing materials into the reactor's ruins, thousands of times more than should have been needed. In this way, they fought against nuclear hazard. Other materials were also thrown in. They were intended to fill the reactor's pit and form a filtering barrier to stop the spreading radioactivity. Among them were clay, sand, and dolomite. Two thousand six hundred tons during the first days. Last, various things that contained metallic plumbum—lead—were thrown: shot, billets, and other items. The lead was supposed to melt when it came into contact with the hot materials of the reactor. In this way, it would neutralize some of the heat-release. To prevent China Syndrome, about 2400 tons of lead materials were thrown into the reactor. According to the initial plan, the pit of the reactor was to be covered gradually with dry substances. That would diminish radioactive release, and at the same time reduce the heat. Experts considered that these combined actions would cause a decrease in the release, then an increase—a breaching—of hot gases, and then a final decrease. Many reasons prevented these experts from correctly estimating the quantity of released activity. Mistakes in measuring were immense. Nevertheless, these measurements showed first the decrease of radioactive release, and then the increase. And then … hurrah! The release was diminished by hundreds of times. It happened on the evening of May 6.
Alexander Borovoi (My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe)
We have spoken already that on the sixth of May, ten days after the accident, the release of radioactivity out of the destroyed Unit, which threatened to cause serious disasters, decreased suddenly by hundreds of times. At the time, the reason for this decrease was considered to be the effect of all the materials that had been thrown from the helicopters. Now we know that those materials hadn’t played their proper role. The explanation is different now. At that time, the fuel, having melted the lower protective plate of the reactor, dissolved in other melted materials and formed radioactive lava, never seen in nature before. Lava spread in the lower stores of the block and started to cool. The radioactive release was practically stopped. China Syndrome—the burning of concrete plates and the gradual falling of the fuel— worked only for that lower plate and, to some extent, for the floor of the room situated right under the reactor.
Alexander Borovoi (My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe)
Thermal hazard: sometimes called the China Syndrome, also caused fear and anxiety. This name, taken from the 1979 film of the same name, means that nuclear fuel, which gets hot because of residual afterheat, starts to burn through the floors of a reactor’s buildings one by one, going down until it reaches underground waters and contaminates them.
Alexander Borovoi (My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe)
To prevent China Syndrome, about 2400 tons of lead materials were thrown into the reactor. According to the initial plan, the pit of the reactor was to be covered gradually with dry substances. That would diminish radioactive release, and at the same time reduce the heat. Experts considered that these combined actions would cause a decrease in the release, then an increase—a breaching—of hot gases, and then a final decrease. Many reasons prevented these experts from correctly estimating the quantity of released activity. Mistakes in measuring were immense. Nevertheless, these measurements showed first the decrease of radioactive release, and then the increase. And then … hurrah! The release was diminished by hundreds of times. It happened on the evening of May 6.
Alexander Borovoi (My Chernobyl: The Human Story of a Scientist and the nuclear power Plant Catastrophe)
We want an apocalypse to look like an apocalypse, not a slow day at the mall.
Karl Taro Greenfeld (China Syndrome: The True Story of the 21st Century's First Great Epidemic)
There were monkeys from India and Bangladesh, musk oxen from Tibet, snakes and lizards from Thailand and Laos, wild dogs from Burma, birds from Vietnam and Indonesia, and bats from Wuhan and Guizhou.
Karl Taro Greenfeld (China Syndrome: The True Story of the 21st Century's First Great Epidemic)