Buffett Best Quotes

Warren Buffett is one of the best learning machines on this earth. The turtles which outrun the hares are learning machines. If you stop learning in this world, the world rushes right by you.

What the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact.

Reading could be the BEST addiction one could have. The only proven side effect is imagination & an edge in knowledge.

The rule is simple: People with integrity are predisposed to perform; people without integrity are predisposed not to perform. It is best not to get the two confused.

This is how top investor Warren Buffett does things: “Each deal we measure against the second-best deal that is available at any given time—even if it means doing more of what we are already doing.

Hold an index fund for 20 years or more, adding new money every month, and you are all but certain to outper-forms the vast majority of professional and individual investors alike. Late in his life, Graham praised index funds as the best choice for individual investors, as does Warren Buffett.6

Everybody wants attention and admiration. Nobody wants to be criticized. The sweetest sound in the English language is the sound of a person’s own name. The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it. If you are wrong, admit it quickly and emphatically. Ask questions instead of giving direct orders. Give the other person a fine reputation to live up to. Call attention to people’s mistakes indirectly. Let the other person save face.

Do what you love and work for whom you admire the most, and you've given yourself the best chance in life you can.

Tom Murphy, CEO of Capital Cities/ABC and considered by Buffett to be the best business manager in the country, prays every day to be humble.

For Buffett, managers are stewards of shareholder capital. The best managers think like owners in making business decisions.

The non-profit industry itself, “the most dysfunctional $300 billion industry in the world,” as he saw it. Mullaney had come to believe that too many philanthropists engage in what Peter Buffett, a son of the über-billionaire Warren Buffett, calls “conscience laundering”—doing charity to make themselves feel better rather than fighting to figure out the best ways to alleviate suffering.

You are your own best teacher. ~Jimmy Buffett

The best education you can get is investing in yourself. But this doesn’t always mean college or university.” In

You’ve gotta keep control of your time, and you can’t unless you say no. You can’t let people set your agenda in life.

The idea of finding talented people to do what they do best is one of Buffett’s driving principles.

At their best, conglomerates enable the tax efficient transfer of cash from businesses that cannot use the money intelligently to those that can. Berkshire is a very rational conglomerate.

Stocks are the things to own over time. Productivity will increase and stocks will increase with it. There are only a few things you can do wrong. One is to buy or sell at the wrong time. Paying high fees is the other way to get killed. The best way to avoid both of these is to buy a low-cost index fund, and buy it over time. Be greedy when others are fearful, and fearful when others are greedy, but don’t think you can outsmart the market. “If a cross-section of American industry is going to do well over time, then why try to pick the little beauties and think you can do better? Very few people should be active investors.

A partner who is not subservient and who himself is extremely logical . . . is probably the best mechanism you can have.” Munger, the ideal foil, has shot down so many investment ideas that Buffett refers to him as “The Abominable No-Man.

The best protection against inflation, according to Buffett, is your own earning power. If you constantly increase your earning power, you’ll be sure to get your share of the economic pie. The next best thing is to own wonderful businesses, especially those that have low capital requirements.

Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway and investor of legendary repute: "Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.

I do not believe in the power of brand names or in emulating any of the brand name investors out there. It is a fact that all—if not at least most—of the biggest names in American finance and industry out there today have proven after the 2008 crisis to be some of the most incompetent people there are. Starting with the untouchable Goldman Sachs, who was bailed out by over $5 billion from Warren Buffett, to AIG and Citibank, who were bailed out by the hundreds of billions of dollars from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), having a name and a history does not make you the brightest and the best. All it takes is one nincompoop with a huge ego or a board of directors who think they are smarter than everyone else to destroy what has taken generations to build.

Many security analysts still believe that agencies are a poor investment. Not so Warren Buffett, one of the most successful investors in the world. He has taken substantial positions in three publicly held agencies, and is quoted as saying, ‘The best business is a royalty on the growth of others, requiring very little capital itself … such as the top international advertising agencies.’ If

Charles Munger, right-hand adviser to Warren Buffett, the richest man on the planet, is known for his unparalleled clear thinking and near-failure-proof track record. How did he refine his thinking to help build a $3 trillion business in Berkshire Hathaway? The answer is “mental models,” or analytical rules-of-thumb4 pulled from disciplines outside of investing, ranging from physics to evolutionary biology. Eighty to 90 models have helped Charles Munger develop, in Warren Buffett’s words, “the best 30-second mind in the world. He goes from A to Z in one move. He sees the essence of everything before you even finish the sentence.

The Art of Subtraction If there is one habit that all of the investors in this chapter have in common, it’s this: They focus almost exclusively on what they’re best at and what matters most to them. Their success derives from this fierce insistence on concentrating deeply in a relatively narrow area while disregarding countless distractions that could interfere with their pursuit of excellence. Jason Zweig, an old friend who is a personal finance columnist at the Wall Street Journal and the editor of a revised edition of The Intelligent Investor, once wrote to me, “Think of Munger and Miller and Buffett: guys who just won’t spend a minute of time or an iota of mental energy doing or thinking about anything that doesn’t make them better. . . . Their skill is self-honesty. They don’t lie to themselves about what they are and aren’t good at. Being honest with yourself like that has to be part of the secret. It’s so hard and so painful to do, but so important.

All 250 + episodes to date can be found at tim.blog/ podcast and itunes.com/ timferriss Jamie Foxx on Workout Routines, Success Habits, and Untold Hollywood Stories (# 124)—tim.blog/ jamie The Scariest Navy SEAL I’ve Ever Met . . . and What He Taught Me (# 107)—tim.blog/ jocko Arnold Schwarzenegger on Psychological Warfare (and Much More) (# 60)—tim.blog/ arnold Dom D’Agostino on Fasting, Ketosis, and the End of Cancer (# 117)—tim.blog/ dom2 Tony Robbins on Morning Routines, Peak Performance, and Mastering Money (# 37)—tim.blog/ tony How to Design a Life—Debbie Millman (# 214)—tim.blog/ debbie Tony Robbins—On Achievement Versus Fulfillment (# 178)—tim.blog/ tony2 Kevin Rose (# 1)—tim.blog/ kevinrose [If you want to hear how bad a first episode can be, this delivers. Drunkenness didn’t help matters.] Charles Poliquin on Strength Training, Shredding Body Fat, and Increasing Testosterone and Sex Drive (# 91)—tim.blog/ charles Mr. Money Mustache—Living Beautifully on $ 25–27K Per Year (# 221)—tim.blog/ mustache Lessons from Warren Buffett, Bobby Fischer, and Other Outliers (# 219)—tim.blog/ buffett Exploring Smart Drugs, Fasting, and Fat Loss—Dr. Rhonda Patrick (# 237)—tim.blog/ rhonda 5 Morning Rituals That Help Me Win the Day (# 105)—tim.blog/ rituals David Heinemeier Hansson: The Power of Being Outspoken (# 195)—tim.blog/ dhh Lessons from Geniuses, Billionaires, and Tinkerers (# 173)—tim.blog/ chrisyoung The Secrets of Gymnastic Strength Training (# 158)—tim.blog/ gst Becoming the Best Version of You (# 210)—tim.blog/ best The Science of Strength and Simplicity with Pavel Tsatsouline (# 55)—tim.blog/ pavel Tony Robbins (Part 2) on Morning Routines, Peak Performance, and Mastering Money (# 38)—tim.blog/ tony How Seth Godin Manages His Life—Rules, Principles, and Obsessions (# 138)—tim.blog/ seth The Relationship Episode: Sex, Love, Polyamory, Marriage, and More (with Esther Perel) (# 241)—tim.blog/ esther The Quiet Master of Cryptocurrency—Nick Szabo (# 244)—tim.blog/ crypto Joshua Waitzkin (# 2)—tim.blog/ josh The Benevolent Dictator of the Internet, Matt Mullenweg (# 61)—tim.blog/ matt Ricardo Semler—The Seven-Day Weekend and How to Break the Rules (# 229)—tim.blog/ ricardo

The big question about how people behave is whether they’ve got an Inner Scorecard or an Outer Scorecard. It helps if you can be satisfied with an Inner Scorecard. I always pose it this way. I say: ‘Lookit. Would you rather be the world’s greatest lover, but have everyone think you’re the world’s worst lover? Or would you rather be the world’s worst lover but have everyone think you’re the world’s greatest lover?’ Now, that’s an interesting question. “Here’s another one. If the world couldn’t see your results, would you rather be thought of as the world’s greatest investor but in reality have the world’s worst record? Or be thought of as the world’s worst investor when you were actually the best? “In teaching your kids, I think the lesson they’re learning at a very, very early age is what their parents put the emphasis on. If all the emphasis is on what the world’s going to think about you, forgetting about how you really behave, you’ll wind up with an Outer Scorecard. Now, my dad: He was a hundred percent Inner Scorecard guy. “He was really a maverick. But he wasn’t a maverick for the sake of being a maverick. He just didn’t care what other people thought. My dad taught me how life should be lived. I’ve never seen anybody quite like him.

Buffett declared the best inflation hedge is a company with a wonderful product that requires little capital to grow. As a test, he invited each of us to look at our own earning ability. In inflation, your compensation can go up without any additional investment. As a business example, Buffett noted that when See’s Candy was purchased in 1971, it had the revenues of $25 million and sold 16 million pounds of candy annually with $9 million in tangible assets. Today, See’s sells $300 million of candy with $40 million of tangible assets. Berkshire needed to invest only $31 million to generate a more than 10-fold increase in revenues. In aggregate, Buffett noted that Berkshire has earned $1.5 billion in profits at See’s over the years. See’s inventory turns fast, has no receivables and has little fixed investment – a perfect inflation hedge. Buffett allowed that if you have tons of receivables and inventory, that’s a lousy business in inflation. The railroad and MidAmerican Energy both have these undesirable characteristics, but that is offset by their utility to the economy and subsequent allowable returns. Buffett rued that there simply aren’t enough “See’s Candys” to buy. Buffett added that being an investor has made him a better businessman and that being a businessman has made him a better investor.(125) Munger noted that they didn’t always know this inflation-business element, which shows how continuous learning is so important.

I insist on a lot of time being spent, almost every day, to just sit and think. That is very uncommon in American business. I read and think. So I do more reading and thinking, and make less impulse decisions than most people in business. I do it because I like this kind of life.

Dimon was in his best Warren Buffett–inspired investor communication style: full, open disclosure, underscoring the risks involved, but also articulating the philosophy and reasons behind his decisions.

From peak to trough (June 1998 through March 2000), Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway fell 51% in value! During this time, I estimated that Buffett's net worth fell by more than $10 billion. How much Berkshire did Buffett sell? How much Cisco did he buy? Zero point zero. Not tempted by tech stocks, Buffett remained committed to value investing, and it paid off.1 One of the keys to successfully managing your money is to accept, like Buffett did, that there will be times when your style is out of favor or when your portfolio hits a rough patch. It's when you start to reach for opportunities that you can do serious damage to your financial well‐being.

When dealing only with his own money, investment losses never bothered Munger much. To him it was like a losing night in a regular poker game where you knew you were one of the best players—you'd make up the difference later. But he now found that reported, temporary quotational losses in the Wheeler, Munger limited partnership accounts gave him tremendous pain. And so, by the end of 1974, he had resolved, like Buffett, to stop managing money for others in a limited partnership format. He would liquidate Wheeler, Munger after its asset value made a substantial recovery. And he would liquidate soon enough so that he would not take any general partner's override when the main investment positions were distributed. In 1975, Wheeler, Munger did make an impressive recovery with a gain of 73.2 percent, and Munger and Marshall liquidated the partnership early in 1976.

A SHAREHOLDER ONCE ASKED BUFFETT how he spent his days. Warren said he mostly read and talked on the telephone. "That's what I do. Charlie, what do you do?" "That [question] reminds me very much of a friend of mine in World War II in a group that had nothing to do," replied Munger. "A general once went up to my friend's boss, we'll call him Captain Glotz. He said, 'Captain Glotz, what do you do?' His boss said, 'Not a damn thing.' " "The General got madder and madder and turned to my friend and said, 'What do you do?' " "My friend said, 'I help Captain Glotz.' That's the best way to describe what I do at Berkshire.

Along the way I’ve picked up a few tips. Warren Buffett told me he always travels with his own pillow. Good advice. A navy blue suit never shows dirt, even if you get mistaken for a flight attendant every now and then. When someone tells you they’re praying for you, just say a polite “Thank you” and move on. After all, it can’t hurt, right? Calling home every night, no matter where you are or how late it is, helps. Even when Kirk is already asleep and I just get his voice mail I feel better. Try to know where the best ice cream is in any given airport terminal. A portable clothes steamer can be a lifesaver, since you can use it anywhere and don’t need an ironing board. (Believe me, it works—even in a public bathroom an hour before an event.) Sleep whenever you can, even if it’s for fifteen minutes on a flight. And never shy away from telling people what you do. You dispel myths, for others and yourself.

But it is the long-term merits of the index fund—broad diversification, weightings paralleling those of the stocks that comprise the market, minimal portfolio turnover, and low cost—that commend it to wise investors. Consider these words from perhaps the wisest investor of all, Warren E. Buffett, from the 1996 Annual Report of Berkshire Hathaway Corporation: Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.

If you can identify six wonderful businesses, that is all the diversification you need. And you will make a lot of money. And I can guarantee that going into a seventh one instead of putting more money into your first one is gotta be a terrible mistake. Very few people have gotten rich on their seventh best idea. But a lot of people have gotten rich with their best idea. So I would say for anyone working with normal capital who really knows the businesses they have gone into, six is plenty, and I [would] probably have half of [it in] what I like best.3 There

When it comes to investing, it’s critical not to “force it.” Markets will cycle. There will be times when you too feel “out of step” with the market, just as Buffett did in the late 1960s. You’ll find that during the late bull market mania of the Go-Go years, his standards remained firmly set, while the pressure to perform caused the standards of many of even the best around him to crumble. It’s hard not to cave your principles in at the top of the cycle when your value approach has apparently stopped working and everyone around you seems to be making money easily (that’s why so many people do it). However, it’s more often than not a “buy high, sell low” strategy. Buffett set his plan, established his standards, and then entered the fray, maintaining the courage of his convictions, come what may.

The happiest people do not necessarily have the best things. They simply appreciate the things they have.

Warren Buffett puts it all rather well: “What the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact.

Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has worked extraordinarily well over time. It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it will continue to do so. America’s best days lie ahead.

All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks.

Buffett’s 1952 memo on Cleveland Worsted Mills mentioned that the stock traded below net current asset value and had “several well-equipped mills.”98 He thought the company had ample earnings to cover the dividend, a view supported by the summary financials found in Table 1. The company paid $8.00 a share out to shareholders, and the last year the company earned below this figure was 1945.99 The income and return on capital figures were a little concerning. Like Marshall-Wells in the first chapter, Cleveland Worsted Mills was coming off the post-World War II highs and falling back to earth, earning a respectable but not extraordinary return on invested capital in 1951. Worsted was a commodity product, with shortages the sole reason for the company’s previously rising income and returns on capital. As the market normalized, the company was unlikely to earn above-average returns on capital in the future.

But this time around, and perhaps for the first time in his career, he realized that American Express’s most important asset by far did not appear on its balance sheet—it existed in people’s minds. The company’s four historical cash cows—express, money order, travelers cheques, and charge card—all depended on safeguarding cash before it arrived at its destination.

Micky had another high finance trick up his sleeve: That year, P&R sold coal properties to Reading Anthracite, its wholly owned subsidiary, taking equity and debt in return. Instead of bringing up operating profit, P&R accounted for the proceeds as debt repayment from Reading Anthracite and paid it out as a mostly tax-free distribution. This allowed the operating profits at the subsidiary to be upstreamed to the parent not as a dividend, but rather as repayment of intercompany debt, which in turn allowed the distribution by the parent to shareholders to be treated as a mostly tax-free distribution.166

Nearly all the characteristics that became famous hallmarks of Berkshire Hathaway—the 19th-century industrial beginnings, the irreversible secular decline of the original business, the initial cheap valuation, the fight for full control, the partial liquidation of inventory to raise cash, the reallocation of capital towards new and better businesses, the clever management compensation, the behind-the-scenes tax minimization strategies, the reliance on personal friendships to source deals, and the fundamental integrity and trustworthiness of company leadership as the foundation of a sprawling conglomerate—

One of the stocks Munger persuaded Buffett to buy was British Columbia Power. Munger, who had just started running his own partnership in 1962, thought the opportunity was such an extraordinary risk-reward that he not only put his entire partnership into the company but also used a credit line from the Pacific Stock Exchange to leverage his position.181 While Buffett certainly liked the stock as well, he didn’t go as far as his impatient friend—the investment accounted for 11.2% of the Buffett Partnership at the end of 1962, its second-largest position behind Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company.182

W.A.C. Bennett grew tired of the company’s obstinance. In August 1961, after rumors of a potential takeover had circulated within the province for months, Bennett introduced the Power Development Act into the legislature in order to confiscate BC Electric for C$111.0 million. The bill passed unanimously, allowing the government to seize control of the utility. The move was highly controversial, sparking an uproar within the business press, with some overly dramatic papers even labeling Bennett a dictator. In an unfortunate coincidence, the head of British Columbia Power and BC Electric, A.E. “Dal” Grauer, had passed away a few days earlier, and his funeral transpired on the very same day the government took over the company he had led.184 In addition to taking BC Electric, the bill offered to buy the rest of BC Power for C$68.6 million, with interest accruing on this amount until the offer expired at the end of July 1963. Combined with the C$111.0 million paid for BC Electric, this offer would result in a total payment for all of BC Power’s operations of C$179.6 million—or the equivalent of C$38.00 per share. Bennett justified this price by highlighting that the proposal was a premium to the C$34.75 price the shares sold for the day before the expropriation.185 While the combined price of C$38.00 per share was reasonable, the valuation for the constituent parts was peculiar. The C$111.0 million price for BC Electric matched its paid-in capital but ignored the other C$28.6 million of common book equity. And this amount sidestepped the debate over whether book value was even an appropriate methodology for the utility in the first place. The C$68.6 million price for the rest of BC Power’s assets was even odder since these remnant assets generated no income and were carried on the balance sheet at only C$4.0 million. This was a clear overpayment for the holding company’s assets, proposed to entice it into consenting to the BC Electric takeover.186 Predictably, BC Power did not stand idly by. After preliminary attempts to negotiate a higher price were thwarted, the company took action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on November 13, 1961. BC Power sought rulings on the validity of the initial Act, the right to additional compensation, and the convertibility feature of debentures issued by BC Electric (more on this last point in the next section).187 While the parties awaited trial, the government took additional steps to further entrench the takeover. At the end of March 1962—nearly eight months after the original seizure—the British Columbia legislature passed two new statutes. The first was the province’s amendment of the Power Development Act, which paid an additional C$60.8 million to BC Power for BC Electric and eliminated the offer for the rest of the parent company’s assets. Table 1 shows that the amendment didn’t significantly alter the total compensation. But the new consideration was a more realistic number for BC Electric and solved for the peculiar offer for the remaining assets, which BC Power would now have to sell themselves.

Cleveland Worsted Mills workers chose to strike in August 1955, seeking higher pay and a union contract. Poss thought the 1954 earnings were the beginning of a negative trend, with the shift to synthetic fibers and low-cost competitors dimming the business’ prospects. On December 31, 1955, Poss announced he intended to liquidate, with shareholders solidifying the plan in a vote the following month.103 The liquidation was wildly successful for shareholders. In 1957, the company sent $185.00 per share to shareholders, exceeding the $178.05 of tangible book value at the end of 1955. Some additional payments trickled through over the following years, with $10.00 sent in 1959, $3.00 in 1960, and $0.63 in 1961, totaling $198.63 of liquidating distributions.104 A holder who purchased the security at the midpoint of the 1952 range would have earned a 21.0% IRR through the end of the liquidation.

Newman preferred to buy businesses whose management would stay in place to run their companies as subsidiaries of P&R. And he preferred to use his network to source deals rather than rely on investment bankers.

I went to an annual meeting of Cleveland’s Worst Mill, and I flew all the way to Cleveland. I got there about five minutes late, and the meeting had been adjourned. And here I was, this kid from Omaha, twenty-two years old, with my own money in the stock. The chairman said, “Sorry, too late.” But then their sales agent, who was on the board of directors, actually took pity on me, and so he got me off on the side and talked to me and answered some questions.102

Buffett’s thinking was simple: He bought the stock because it sold for less than its net cash. Union Street Railway was a tiny company, selling for a $643,000 market capitalization and an enterprise value of negative $327,000. Discussing his rationale, he said: It had a hundred sixteen buses and a little amusement park at one time. I started buying the stock because they had eight hundred thousand dollars in treasury bonds, a couple of hundred thousand in cash, and outstanding bus tickets of ninety-six thousand dollars. Call it a million dollars, about sixty bucks a share. When I started buying it, the stock was selling around thirty or thirty-five bucks a share.128

But the company had some additional items besides the net cash. Buffett noted the outstanding tickets. All sold—but unused—tickets were a liability; they were a form of deferred revenue. The company had received the cash, but the tickets were not yet redeemed. The value of this liability remained unchanged from 1952 to 1953, suggesting the tickets were very unlikely to be utilized. Plus, since the marginal cost of an additional passenger was zero, no cash expenditure would be incurred even if a passenger used the ticket. Therefore, it was appropriate to treat the cash as ‘earned’ and to write the liability down to zero, adding another $1.61 of value. Then there were the long-term assets. While the property and equipment might be worth less than their value on the company’s books, special deposits and insurance trusts had real value that would likely be released over time. These two items would add another $53.72 of value. With the stock trading below net cash, these assets were all gravy.

Emotion may have driven Buffett’s response to the Stanton deception. He later stated, “Looking back, it’s interesting, that tender offer, I didn’t realize it, but it happened about five days after my dad had died, and whether that had affected me or not, I don’t know.”140 By 1965, Buffett controlled the company, using this power to fire Stanton and take a seat on the board of directors. These actions put the textile firm on a path to becoming one of the most valuable enterprises in the world. If not for Stanton’s deceit, Berkshire Hathaway probably would have wound up as a forgotten old textile mill.

Buffett classified Amex as a ‘relatively undervalued’ general rather than a ‘private owner’ one. He first broke generals into ‘Relatively Undervalued’ and ‘Private Owner’ in January 1965, after his initial purchase of American Express. Buffett noted that this category comprised securities where the private owner concept was not meaningful, often due to the large size of the securities within this group, and said that ‘relatively undervalued’ generals were cheap compared to securities of the same quality.

Buffett’s thesis on Cleveland Worsted Mills was straightforward. The stock sold for below its net current asset value and at a bargain P/E multiple. The worsted manufacturer was consistently profitable and paid a fat dividend. By 1952, having graduated from Columbia and now an employee at Buffett-Falk, Buffett liked the stock enough to write a brief report on it, stating, “The $8 dividend provides a well-protected 7% yield on the current price of approximately $115.”86 The stock had been cheap for some time. Buffett, in fact, had held the stock in 1951, selling at a slight loss as he invested his capital in companies like GEICO and Timely Clothes. Ben Graham also liked the stock, having made the Cleveland firm a 1.5% position in the Graham-Newman fund and including the company in the 1951 edition of Security Analysis in a table titled “Six Common Stocks Undervalued in 1949,” along with Marshall-Wells.87

Buffett’s biggest winners in the 1950s and 1960s usually had an extra kicker—a shift in capital allocation that drove superb returns.

I went to Delaware, Ohio, to check out Greif Bros. Cooperage. (Who knows anything about cooperage anymore?) Its chairman met with me. I didn’t have appointments; I would just drop in. I found that people always talked to me. All these people helped me.” —Warren Buffett59

Cooperages typically specialized in one or the other because they each had different customer bases and wood requirements. They were often located in major towns to be close to their customers. Slack cooperage demand was more fragmented than tight cooperage, and therefore had a more diverse customer base. While most of the industry was tight cooperage, Greif focused on slack, with the company having the most slack capacity of any player. The cooperage industry had grown increasingly concentrated over time, with the top four companies’ share of total production increasing from 26% in 1935 to 47% in 1947.66 John Raible acquired control of the company from the Greif brothers in 1913. Raible was a wealthy investor, not terribly interested in the cooperage business. But his leadership was valuable, helping the company grow revenue from $1 million when he took over to $10 million when he took Greif public in 1926. But Raible’s reign came to an end in 1947, undone by a fellow board member. John Dempsey, an accountant in his early 30s, had joined the firm as a director and company secretary in 1946. After Raible tried to buy shares held by Dempsey’s wife and mother-in-law at a price the young accountant thought too cheap, Dempsey accumulated enough voting shares to take control of the company. Dempsey, claiming to be motivated by Raible calling Greif ‘my wood company,’ purchased over 50% of the voting shares and made himself chairman.67

Greif had a quirk in its share structure that presented a valuation challenge. The company had two shares of stock, Class A and Class B, but only the A shares were publicly traded. The B shares were closely held and not exchange-traded. Like most companies with dual-class share structures, they had differing voting rights. Unlike most companies with dual-class share structures, the classes were entitled to differing dividend distributions and liquidation proceeds. The A shares—the class Buffett bought—had first rights to liquidation proceeds and dividends. Plus, the A shares were entitled to cumulative dividends while the B shares were not. The A shares would only gain voting rights if the company failed to pay the A’s entitled dividend for four quarters. However, the Class B shares received a higher split of additional dividends once the distribution exceeded a certain rate. This made calculating market capitalization figures difficult since there was no price readily available for the Class B shares.

As Table 3 lays out, most of the assets were current assets. While holding inventory in a declining industry might be cause for concern, Greif only had around two and a half months of inventory on hand, so this was a reasonably safe asset.

Union Street Railway was a New Bedford, Massachusetts-based bus company. With the equity trading below the net cash on the company’s balance sheet, Union Street was a classic net-net when Buffett bought the stock. This was a small, thinly traded company with a market capitalization below $1 million. The small float meant acquiring stock required a bit of work and persistence by the young, enterprising investor. Like the other stocks discussed so far, it was cheap. But in contrast to the previous investments discussed in this book, this one was actually losing money at the time of Buffett’s purchase. Yet this stock would be a huge winner for Buffett, yielding him a dollar profit worth more than 4.5x the average household yearly income at the time. After accumulating a meaningful stake in the company, Buffett took a trip to Massachusetts to meet with the company’s president. While he did not run a proxy contest or take aggressive action to prompt a capital return, the company paid a substantial dividend shortly after his visit.109 Union Street Railway was an early lesson in how positive changes in capital allocation can lead to windfall profits.

Phil Carret, the money manager who bought the stock on Howard Buffett’s recommendation in 1946, owned it all the way to his passing at the age of 101 in 1998. Carret grew to admire Greif, calling it the best-managed company he knew of. Buffett would later call Carret a hero of his. Greif was a successful investment for Carret, as the stock went from a split-adjusted $0.68 when he bought it to $36.50 when he passed.

The balance sheet told a different story. Selling for $13.38 per share at the end of 1954—an $18.8 million market capitalization—P&R traded close to its net current asset value of $9.16 per share, a figure that included significant excess inventory. While this alone was not enough to make the stock cheap, P&R also had an off-balance-sheet asset known as culm banks, a waste material accumulated from anthracite mining which was thought to have value as a fuel source. Buffett believed this asset could be worth around $8 per share.150 The net current asset value and the culm banks combined were worth $17 a share, enough to give Buffett confidence that the stock was cheap. But, as Table 2 shows, the company also had substantial property, plant, and equipment. These fixed assets were almost certainly worth less than their carrying value, as the industry had deteriorated since the company last valued them when it emerged from bankruptcy in 1945. While it wasn’t clear what they were worth, they were certainly worth something. Finally, and ultimately most importantly, Ben Graham was on P&R’s board of directors, becoming a member after purchasing the stock in 1952. Buffett, who had discovered the stock on his own, would join Graham’s firm in 1954. While Graham had not taken any significant action as a board member by then, Buffett sensed that his professor, mentor, and now boss would eventually make something happen. As he later stated, “I was just a peon sitting in the outer office… I was not in the inner circle, but I was terribly interested, knowing something was going on.

So not only were the liabilities from Allied’s bankruptcy becoming defined, but the core business was not showing any signs of stress from the scandal. That left valuation. At his $40 per share purchase price, and in contrast to most of the stocks discussed in this book, American Express did not sell for an obvious bargain price. With a $178.4 million market capitalization and $124.1 million enterprise value, the stock sold for 15.8x 1963 earnings, 7.8x EV/1963 EBIT, and 2.3x P/TB. It didn’t look that cheap, and this valuation didn’t include an adjustment for the cost of the salad oil settlement.270

The investment was approximately 14.3% of the Partnership’s assets when he wrote to Howard Clark in June 1964. But Buffett kept buying the stock as the salad oil scandal receded from the limelight. By November, he owned approximately 90,000 shares, up from the 70,000 in June. Buffett kept buying the stock into 1966, more than tripling his stake in the company: He scooped up more than 5% of American Express’s shares, up from the 1.6% stake when he wrote to Howard Clark in 1964.277 The position became such a significant percentage of the portfolio that Buffett amended his ‘Ground Rules’ to partners in November 1965, adding a seventh rule: We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment.278 American Express was the Partnership’s largest investment at the end of 1965 and 1966, and it crushed the market in each of 1964, 1965, and 1966.279 The salad oil scandal was considered over by the end of 1964 despite negotiations still ongoing; the major claims wouldn’t settle until 1967, with some minor suits outside the main case lasting until the 1970s.280,281 Table 2 shows that revenue and income exploded as the Partnership added to its stake.

In late 1967, Buffett wrote: Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess—I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a “high-probability insight.” This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side—the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.297

The stock was an obvious bargain—anyone looking at the Moody’s Manuals could tell it was cheap. But this was a small company, and its stock was hard to find. Even Buffett, with a net worth of around $100,000 at this point, had to be resourceful to source enough shares to build a meaningful position. So he ran ads in the local newspaper to find holders that would sell to him. But the company knew its stock was cheap, and it ran competing ads. Since Union Street Railway was a public utility, Buffett was eventually able to get the list of largest shareholders from the Massachusetts public utility commission. These efforts allowed him to source 576 shares, 3.1% of the company’s 1953 shares outstanding.

The valuation analysis was simple—anyone could see the stock was incredibly cheap. But it had been traded below net cash for several years before the company distributed cash to shareholders. Returning the cash was the critical factor in driving excellent returns. Assuming Buffett bought the stock in 1954 at $35 and sold in 1957 (having received the $50 per share distribution and a few dollars extra in dividends) when it traded between $20 and $28, he would have more than doubled his money and earned around a 30% IRR.135 The stock didn’t work because it was cheap—it worked because management returned capital to shareholders. The other securities discussed in this book were also incredible bargains—but it took action to drive wonderful returns for shareholders.

For railroads, ownership of coal lands was a way to stabilize an industry levered to economic volatility and weather, with warmer winters depressing demand. The vertical integration of railroads and miners also helped the players control production and shipments. The industry became highly concentrated, with seven railroad companies controlling over 90% of the coal production in the region. This oligopoly occasionally entered into collusive arrangements and tried to manipulate the price of this critical energy source. Despite these advantages, the Reading Railroad’s spending spree eventually led to trouble, as the combination of leverage, competition, and economic volatility caused the company to declare bankruptcy three times between 1880 and 1896.143 The Reading finally experienced financial success in the early 1900s, only to confront a new problem: The federal government was now determined to curb the power of the railroad and its peers. Congress began to enact legislation designed to split anthracite coal producers from railroads. These early attempts were easily circumvented by the anthracite giants. In 1915, however, the Supreme Court started ruling that the railroad companies violated anti-trust law. In 1920, the Court banned the stock control of coal companies outright, which finally forced some of the largest anthracite operators, including the Reading Railroad, to separate their coal and railroad operations.144

As anthracite production fell after the divorce from the railroad, P&R’s management raised debt to try and minimize the decay through capital investment, thinking new facilities could help the company remain competitive. But industry conditions worsened, and the Great Depression decimated economic activity, leading to significant losses for P&R throughout much of the 1930s. These results culminated in a declaration of bankruptcy in 1937.147 It took eight years for the company to emerge, but the reorganized firm possessed a leaner balance sheet, better prepared to withstand the declining market.148 Ultimately, it didn’t matter, as alternative fuel competition was simply overwhelming. As Figure 1 illustrates, production of hard coal eventually fell nearly 70%, dropping from 99.6 million tons from its 1917 peak all the way down to 30.9 million in 1953. Coal prices rose, mitigating the volume decline (as seen in Figure 2). But there was no hope that the industry would return to its former glory; anthracite coal was in an irreversible decline. This was the seemingly hopeless situation that confronted the young Warren Buffett, still in his early 20s, when he began looking at Philadelphia & Reading. Yet he started buying P&R stock at around $19 per share in 1952. When the stock soon plummeted to $9, Buffett, unphased by the decline, loaded up. By the end of 1954, he had invested $35,000 into the company, making it his largest personal position.149

In his 1961 letter to partners, Buffett laid out three broad categories of investments: generals, workouts, and controls. Generals were undervalued securities where Buffett had no say in corporate policies, nor a timetable for when the stock might reflect its intrinsic value. Buffett pointed out that the generals would behave like the Dow in the short term but outperform the index over the long term. Buffett expected to have five or six positions in this category that were 5% to 10% of total assets each, with smaller positions in another ten to fifteen. Later on, in his 1964 letter, Buffett would break generals into two categories: private owner basis and relatively undervalued. Private owner generals were generally cheap stocks with no immediate catalyst, while relatively undervalued securities were cheap compared to those of a similar quality. Relatively undervalued securities were generally larger companies where Buffett did not think a private owner valuation was relevant.173 Workouts were securities whose performance depended on corporate actions, such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, and spin-offs. Buffett expected to have ten to fifteen of these in the portfolio and thought this category would be a reasonably stable source of earnings for the fund, outperforming the Dow when the market had a bad year and underperforming in a strong year. He anticipated these investments would earn him 10% to 20%, excluding any leverage. Buffett would take on debt, up to 25% of the partnership’s net worth, to fund this category. While he didn’t disclose his allocation every year, he put around 15% of the partnership in workouts in 1966 but increased that to a quarter of the portfolio in 1967 and 1968, when he was having trouble finding bargains.174 The final category was controls, where the partnership took a significant position to change corporate policy. Buffett said these investments might take several years to play out and would, like workouts, have minimal correlation to the Dow’s gyrations. Buffett pointed out that generals could become controls if the stock price remained depressed.

Table 1: Change in compensation Source: British Columbia Power, 1962 annual report. Figures in thousands other than per share data. The second key legislation was the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Act. This act merged the British Columbia Power Commission, a government-owned public utility that served smaller communities unserved by BC Electric, with BC Electric into a single corporation named the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority. This maneuver cemented the two entities together, creating an additional complication if the Court later reversed the takeover.188 With the Amending Act payment in hand, BC Power had cash—less all liabilities—of C$19.30 per share. The stock sold for less than this, closing at C$16.75 the day after the payment and then fluctuated around this number over the coming months.189 At this price, the stock traded at a 13.2% discount to net cash, held around C$2.10 of additional assets, and possessed continued upside if litigation went the company’s way.

Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original “bargain” price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces—never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.107 Cleveland Worsted Mills is a perfect example of a liquidation working out well. The company could have meandered along, trying to earn a mediocre return in a competitive business, but the company chose to close up shop instead. Shareholders were lucky to have Poss at the helm (workers, not so much). He was a significant shareholder and didn’t have the patience to deal with striking employees. He shut down, liquidated, and provided shareholders with a good return.

While the company made some money from the sales charge levied when a customer purchased a money order, it primarily benefited from investing the float created by outstanding money orders that had been paid for at their origin office but not yet cashed at their destination office. Plus, the money order business had an added benefit that helped later on: Immigrants sent the money order abroad, which forced American Express to create a network of banking relationships throughout Europe.238

Formed in 1950, Diners’ Club initiated the first universal restaurant charge card that prominent New York restaurants would accept. Cardholders charged for a meal, and the restaurant collected from the Club less a 5%–10% discount (which restaurants were willing to accept since cardholders typically spent more than those paying with cash on hand). Diners’ Club paid the restaurant and had to collect from cardholders. In the 1950s, credit cards took off in the United States. There were cards for specific companies as well as universal travel and entertainment charge cards.244 American Express debated the merits of creating a card. But by the 1950s, the company’s executives realized that people were using the cards for travel-related services, posing a risk for the travelers cheque. Furthermore, the money order business was becoming less important, with the rise of personal checking accounts stealing business away from money orders. The company finally decided it would be better for American Express to protect itself by making its own card rather than lose all that business.245 American Express debated entering the business by acquiring Diners’ Club. After that deal fell through, American Express decided to go forward by launching its own American Express Credit Card in 1958. The American Express Credit Card was, in reality, a charge card, not a credit card. The latter had a revolving line of credit whose balance could be carried over from month to month. While technically still an extension of credit, the charge card required all outstanding balances to be paid in full each month.246,247 Before launching, American Express reached a deal with the American Hotel Association, providing Amex with 150,000 cardholders and 4,500 participating hotels. American Express then bought 40,000 members from the Gourmet card.248 And when rumors spread that American Express was thinking of starting a card, people wanted in. In contrast to the banks, who literally had to mass-mail cards to people when they rolled out their offerings (a practice made illegal in 1970), people flocked to American Express.249 The brand, whose image had evolved from a guard dog to ‘the guardian of Rome,’ the centurion, had now become a status symbol.

P&R acquired Union Underwear for $15 million. The deal was a big swing for P&R, with the purchase price equal to 35% of its beginning-of-the-year assets. But beneath the big headline number, there were several factors that reduced risk. The deal was done at a salivating valuation: Union was earning $3 million in pre-tax profits—one-fifth of the purchase price—that would be partially sheltered by P&R’s tax loss. Moreover, P&R structured the compensation of Union’s management in an attractive manner: The company provided Goldfarb with a five-year management contract as well as a bonus of 10% of the subsidiary’s operating profits (subject to both a minimum and a cap), ensuring he stayed on and incentivizing him to grow the business.160 Finally, the deal’s consideration was also interesting, which Buffett later reminisced about in the 2001 Berkshire Hathaway chairman’s letter: The [Union Underwear] company possessed $5 million in cash—$2.5 million of which P&R used for the purchase—and was earning about $3 million pre-tax, earnings that could be sheltered by the tax position of P&R. And, oh yes: Fully $9 million of the remaining $12.5 million due was satisfied by non-interest-bearing notes, payable from 50% of any earnings Union had in excess of $1 million. (Those were the days; I get goosebumps just thinking about such deals.)161 Although the P&R board had approved the Union acquisition, Ben Graham was angered by its conservatism and pushed to add more directors. The other members obliged, ceding five additional seats to Graham allies. Jack Goldfarb and Louis Green of Stryker & Brown—the same Louis Green from the Marshall-Wells chapter—were among those added.

What became known as ‘the salad oil scandal’ was a textbook case of management incompetence and stupidity, and investors abandoned the company in droves. The 33-year-old Buffett had kept his eye on the scandal since it broke, but he waited months to start buying. And he started building his investment—the best of the Partnership—during a particularly trying time for him and his family, as his father Howard lay hospital-ridden in the final weeks of his life in April 1964. To the extent he was known at all at the time, Buffett was known for his ability to find quantitative bargains among the semi-anonymous flotsam and jetsam of American capitalism, but American Express was an extremely well-known company. Moreover, Buffett proceeded to write a remarkable letter to Clark in which he rather breezily absolved Amex management of any responsibility for the scandal, encouraged it to use shareholder money (which included Buffett’s) to pay creditors harmed by the scandal, and more or less encouraged Clark to forget the whole thing. Finally, and most importantly, Buffett continued adding to his American Express position long after the scandal had diminished in importance. By the time he sold his position years later, American Express had become the most important individual contributor to the results of the Buffett Partnership and arguably the biggest turning point in Buffett’s career.

It was Micky Newman, the 34-year-old son of Ben’s partner Jerome, who talked him out of it. Micky was more optimistic about the excess inventory P&R had piled up. Moreover, he saw an opportunity to apply some high finance to this industrial company. “Ben wanted to sell at a loss, but we persuaded him not to because I could see some big pluses,” Micky later said. “I could see a huge potential tax loss due to abandonment of deep mines, and in addition, P&R coal had piled up small and unusual amounts of coal.”157 In early 1955, P&R reported a $7.3 million loss for 1954, $5.3 million of which was attributable to write-offs related to the abandonments of mines.158 The big loss gave the Baltimore/Graham-Newman group a chance to increase its control over the company’s corporate governance: Hyland’s broker, Benjamin Palmer, joined the board in February, and Micky Newman joined him three months later. Along with Ben Graham himself, the Baltimore and Graham-Newman shareholder group now controlled three of nine board seats. As a sign of things to come, P&R changed its name and amended its charter to allow the organization to engage in activities other than coal mining. The company dropped the reference to coal from its name, transitioning from the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company to the Philadelphia and Reading Corporation.159 Micky took the initiative to transform the company. His plan was to use the cash P&R generated from liquidating its excess inventory to acquire profitable businesses, whose income would be shielded from future taxes by P&R’s existing tax loss position.

Charlie Munger said many memorable things, but my favorite quote of his is this modest one: “The best thing a human being can do is to help another human being know more.

Second, Buffett ran a highly concentrated portfolio, occasionally investing more than 20% of his fund in a single investment idea. Great investment ideas are rare; Buffett seized on them whenever he uncovered them. Third, Buffett was a tenacious and creative researcher, traveling extensively to learn about companies and industries, pushing his understanding of business beyond what he could learn from the documents. While he was certainly a voracious reader, he also applied similar ferocity to uncovering information through people. Fourth, Buffett possessed a remarkable filter. His ability to sift through investment opportunities quickly, something he has honed throughout his career, allowed him to seize on the best ideas and concentrate

For more reading on these fascinating stories, please see: the Berkshire Hathaway 1988 chairman’s letter for a discussion on Rockwood, the December 6, 1951 edition of The Commercial and Financial Chronicle for Buffett’s GEICO write-up, and the April 9, 1953 edition of The Commercial and Financial Chronicle for Buffett’s Western Insurance Securities write-up. A query on your favorite internet search engine should help you find these. If you’re having trouble, e-mail me at Brett@BuffettsEarlyInvestments.com, and I’d be happy to send them to you. The Snowball also offers vivid accounts of each.

Buffett bought 25 shares of Marshall-Wells in 1950 at $200 per share for a total investment of $5,000. Buffett made the investment through a 50–50 partnership with his father, making his attributable stake $2,500, about a quarter of his net worth. Marshall-Wells had an $11.4 million market capitalization at his purchase price, and with net cash on the books, only a $7.0 million enterprise value.

Buffett had a strong view of how employees should be accountable to the business’s owners, and Marshall-Wells’ leadership did not seem to fit the bill. Management’s lackadaisical approach towards shareholders likely turned the young investor off. And he simply found other investments. At the end of 1950, Buffett owned stocks such as Parkersburg Rig & Reel and two closed-end funds: Selected Industries and U.S. & International Securities.40

Marshall-Wells was a good investment for shareholders at Buffett’s purchase price; an investor would have earned a mid-to-high-teens internal rate of return (IRR) if he sold at the price Ambrook paid in 1956.54,55 The investment is a good illustration of the value investment approach Ben Graham espoused proving effective; the hard assets offered downside protection and provided a margin of safety, allowing the investor to earn a good return despite mediocre future business performance.

The profound point is that the critical link between growth and value creation is the return on incremental capital. Since share prices tend to follow earnings over the long term, the more capital that can be deployed at high rates of return to drive greater earnings growth, the more valuable a company becomes. Warren Buffett summarized the point best: “Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return.”4 The best investments, in other words, combine strong growth with high returns on capital.

The best education you can get is investing in yourself. But this doesn’t always mean college or university.

harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.” -2010 letter

Alternatives include Brookfield Asset Management, Fairfax Financial, Leucadia National, Loews Companies, Markel Corporation, and White Mountains Insurance. While these companies meet Buffett-style compensation criteria, some public investment vehicles have married hedge-fund-style compensation with a value investment approach. Examples include Greenlight Capital Re and Biglari Holdings.

Most institutional and individual investors will find the best way to own common stock is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results [after fees and expenses] delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.”1 —Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway

Rather than attempt to time the market or pick individual stocks, it is more productive to invest and stay invested. As Warren Buffett said: “We continue to make more money when snoring than when active.” Mr. Buffett also said: “Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after expenses and fees) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.

Warren Buffett knows: “What the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact.” The

Mullaney had come to believe that too many philanthropists engage in what Peter Buffett, a son of the über-billionaire Warren Buffett, calls “conscience laundering”—doing charity to make themselves feel better rather than fighting to figure out the best ways to alleviate suffering.

you can simply buy wonderful companies at reasonable prices, and let those companies compound cash over long periods of time. Surprisingly, there aren’t all that many money managers who follow this strategy, even though it’s the one used by some of the world’s most successful investors. (Warren Buffett is the best-known.)

Jason Zweig, senior writer and columnist at Money magazine and coauthor of the revised edition of Benjamin Graham's classic, The Intelligent Investor: "If you buy-and then hold-a total stock market index fund, it is mathematically certain that you will outperform the vast majority of all other investors in the long run. Graham praised index funds as the best choice for individual investors, as does Warren Buffett.

He got the idea to add a mental compound interest as well. So he decided he would sell himself the best hour of the day to improving his own mind, and the world could buy the rest of his time. He

Underperformance—Let’s say an investment manager knows there won’t be more money forthcoming no matter how well a client’s account performs, but it’s clear the account will be lost if it fails to keep up with some index. That’s “benchmark risk,” and the manager can eliminate it by emulating the index. But every investor who’s unwilling to throw in the towel on outperformance, and who chooses to deviate from the index in its pursuit, will have periods of significant underperformance. In fact, since many of the best investors stick most strongly to their approach—and since no approach will work all the time—the best investors can have some of the greatest periods of underperformance. Specifically, in crazy times, disciplined investors willingly accept the risk of not taking enough risk to keep up. (See Warren Buffett and Julian Robertson in 1999. That year, underperformance was a badge of courage because it denoted a refusal to participate in the tech bubble.) • Career risk—This is the extreme form of underperformance risk: the risk that arises when the people who manage money and the people whose money it is are different people. In those cases, the managers (or “agents”) may not care much about gains, in which they won’t share, but may be deathly afraid of losses that could cost them their jobs.

Warren Buffett and George Soros eschew derivatives. Hedge fund managers bet against the Wall Street banks that develop complex products. The best investors – today and yesterday – make money not because they understand abstruse mathematical models, but because they have a deep intuition about the timing and machinations of financial markets. Markets have been complex for a long time, and their ebbs and flows always have depended, not only on intricate disclosures about assets and liabilities, but also on human psychology. That has not changed since the 1920s.

The most important thing successful investors have in common is worrying about what they can control. They don't waste time worrying about which way the market will go or what the Federal Reserve will do or what inflation or interest rates will be next year. They stay within their circle of competence, however narrow that might be. Warren Buffett said, “What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know.

For us, the scoreboard can’t be the only scoreboard. Warren Buffett has said the same thing, making a distinction between the inner scorecard and the external one. Your potential, the absolute best you’re capable of—that’s the metric to measure yourself against. Your standards are. Winning is not enough. People can get lucky and win. People can be assholes and win. Anyone can win. But not everyone is the best possible version of themselves.

5. Live by the sea. 6. Listen to your spirit and find joy. 7. Education, like money, doesn’t make you happy or successful, but it sure helps. 8. Love AND family are the best things we have.

Ben is now 75 and, like Gene Abegg, 81, at Illinois National and Louie Vincenti, 73, at Wesco, continues daily to bring an almost passionately proprietary attitude to the business.  This group of top managers must appear to an outsider to be an overreaction on our part to an OEO bulletin on age discrimination.  While unorthodox, these relationships have been exceptionally rewarding, both financially and personally.  It is a real pleasure to work with managers who enjoy coming to work each morning and, once there, instinctively and unerringly think like owners.  We are associated with some of the very best.