“
The White House released the military aid to Ukraine after allegations of the link to the Biden investigation became public. In other words, the Trump administration released the aid only because it was caught linking the aid to the quest for political dirt.
”
”
Jeffrey Toobin (True Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Investigation of Donald Trump)
“
Instead, Giuliani pressed ahead, with Trump’s encouragement, to begin a full-scale investigation about Joe and Hunter Biden in Ukraine. If Giuliani had done anything else, Donald Trump would not have been impeached. For this reason, Giuliani’s work must rank among the most disastrous pieces of advocacy in the history of American lawyering.
”
”
Jeffrey Toobin (True Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Investigation of Donald Trump)
“
You can’t just go and just flip a switch and change the election,” Rosen responded. “I don’t expect you to do that,” Trump said. “Just say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican congressmen.”[17] Just say it was corrupt. Even though Rosen had told him there was no evidence that it was. Much as with his campaign to get Ukraine to undermine Joe Biden, Trump was not looking for corruption, just someone to say there was so he could weaponize it.
”
”
Peter Baker (The Divider: Trump in the White House, 2017-2021)
“
The legacy of the Biden presidency will be the core national security team that he built and kept in place for nearly four years. They brought decades of experience as well as basic human decency. War shows the traditional and novel ways Biden and his core team pursued an intelligence-driven foreign policy to warn the world that war was coming in Ukraine, to supply Ukraine with the weapons they need to defend themselves against Russia, and to try to tamp down escalations in the Israel-Gaza war.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
Within days, Trump admitted that on July 25 he had called the new president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, to enlist his help against former vice president Joe Biden, who was beating Trump in most polls going into the 2020 election season. Zelensky was desperate for the money Congress had approved to help his country fight Russian-backed separatists in the regions Russia had occupied after the 2014 invasion, but Trump indicated he would release the money only after Zelensky announced an investigation into the actions of Biden’s son Hunter during his time on the board of Ukrainian energy company Burisma.
”
”
Heather Cox Richardson (Democracy Awakening: Notes on the State of America)
“
But Biden drew the line on the kinds of weapons he was prepared to send. He would not go too big or too powerful. If Russia invaded and Ukraine fell in three to five days, the president did not want top-of-the-line American military technology falling into Russian hands. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the images of the Taliban brandishing U.S. weapons and equipment provided to the Afghan military still burned.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
Putin would not stop at Ukraine, Biden was convinced of that. The Ukraine war was now a fight for freedom and freedom loving nations everywhere. Russia had displayed shocking ineptitude in the opening hours and days of the war, piercing the mythology that the Russian army was a formidable, super-capable fighting force.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
I am not sending U.S. troops to Ukraine,” Biden said to Sullivan as the two sat alone in the Oval Office. This was his firm position, his red line not to be crossed—no American troops. U.S. troops in Vietnam had led to catastrophe. The same problem in Afghanistan when Biden as vice president had unsuccessfully opposed adding 30,000 troops.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
In the President’s Daily Brief every morning Biden was presented with an extraordinary intelligence trove on what the Russians were visibly doing with their military forces, but also what the Russians were talking and thinking about doing with those forces. Putin’s ultimate intentions remained unclear. There was an unsettling sense of déjà vu. Biden had been vice president and Blinken was President Obama’s deputy national security adviser when Russian forces swiftly annexed Crimea in southern Ukraine and seized a portion of the Donbas in 2014. Obama and their team had failed to spot Putin’s brazen land grab for what it was and adequately push back on it in time. It had been an easy win for Putin, with few lasting negative ramifications for Russia.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
Ukraine had fought the David and Goliath of battles and held Russia off against all of their expectations. But U.S. intel reports to Biden showed that Putin believed time and the size of Russia’s army were on his side.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
During the call, Trump threatened to withhold aid to Ukraine unless Zelensky provided damaging information on Hunter Biden, the son of Vice President Joe Biden.
”
”
George Stephanopoulos (The Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis)
“
But even if that happened, Jake Sullivan was quick to point out, Ukraine would be under constant threat for years, maybe decades—a threat so omnipresent that it would need to be able to deter Russia from another invasion, whenever Putin rebuilt his sorry force. Meeting that challenge would require an increase in aid and support on a scale that NATO, that Congress, and that even the Ukrainians had never thought about before. “When you think about what we provided in 2021, it was more than we had provided ever before,” Sullivan pointed out much later, looking back at the early days of the war. “It was less than a billion dollars.” That amount was tiny compared to the kind of numbers now kicking around the Pentagon. For Ukraine to survive over the long term, its military would need to be completely overhauled. It needed to become like Israel, said one former military official who was now serving in the Biden administration. It would have to go from a force that was dependent on decrepit Soviet-era leftovers to modern, Western arms—all while fighting a brutal war in real time on its own territory. It might not be a member of NATO for a long, long time. But it needed to be armed like one. —
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
Zelensky wanted—he needed—air defenses. F-16 fighter jets, to maintain air supremacy against the far larger Russian Air Force. A no-fly zone. Tanks. Advanced drones. Most important, long-range missile launchers. There was one in particular that the Pentagon, with its penchant for completely unintelligible acronyms, called the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Zelensky wanted to arm these launchers with one of the crown jewels of the U.S. Army, a missile known as ATACMS that could strike targets nearly two hundred miles away with precision accuracy. That, of course, would give him the capability to fire right into command-and-control centers deep inside Russian territory—exactly Biden’s worst fear. In time, Zelensky added to his list of requests another weapon that raised enormous moral issues: He sought “cluster munitions,” a weapon many of the arms control advocates in the Biden administration had spent decades trying to limit or ban. Cluster bombs are devastating weapons that release scores of tiny bomblets, ripping apart people and personnel carriers and power lines and often mowing through civilians unlucky enough to be living in the area where they are dropped. Worse yet, unexploded bomblets can remain on the ground for years; from past American battlefields—from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq—there were stories of children killed or maimed after picking one up years later. Blinken told colleagues he had spent much of his professional life getting weapons like this banned. Yet the Pentagon stored them across Europe because they were cruelly effective in wiping out an advancing army. And anyway, they said, the Russians were using cluster munitions in Ukraine. With each proposal it was Biden who was most reluctant: F-16s were simply too provocative, he told his staff, because they could strike deep into Russia. The cluster munitions were simply too dangerous to civilians. Conversations with Zelensky were heated. “The first few calls they had turned pretty tense,” one senior administration official told me. Part of the issue was style. Zelensky, in Biden’s view, was simply not grateful for the aid he was getting—a cardinal sin in Biden’s world. By mid-May 2022, his administration had poured nearly $4 billion to the Ukrainian defenses, including some fifty million rounds of small ammunition, tens of thousands of artillery rounds, major antiaircraft and anti-tank systems, intelligence, medical equipment, and more. Zelensky had offered at best perfunctory thanks before pushing for more.
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
To some degree, though, the tension was inevitable. Biden’s national interests—and his global responsibilities—ran headlong into Zelensky’s urgent need to survive another day, another month, another year. Biden feared feeding Putin’s narrative—or his paranoia—but Zelensky saw it differently. As that shell fragment near Zelensky’s residence made clear, Putin was out to kill him and eradicate his country. Zelensky was in a war for the survival of his nation, a war he would never win if Putin could fire on Ukraine from Russian territory and he could not fire back. Biden’s preoccupation was avoiding escalation.
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
Soon, the problems of depleted stockpiles and slow production reached well beyond Ukraine. In the summer of 2022, the CIA was circulating an analysis that China could be moving up the target date for attacking Taiwan out of fear that the United States would move quickly to bolster its defenses. The reality was that the United States was so stressed keeping up with Ukraine’s demands and commitments to other allies, like Saudi Arabia, that it couldn’t supply Taiwan with everything it needed. And Biden knew that the American support for Ukraine could begin to erode. He was already facing a tricky political situation at home, with voters understandably more focused on gas prices and inflation.
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
Yet as time went on and they learned what Putin would tolerate—or not—new options seemed to open up. What this often meant, in practice, was that decisions that seemed bold or even risky at the time later seemed far too modest. The day after the war began, Biden signed off on a $350 million aid package that contained mostly short-range defensive weapons systems and ammunition, things like Javelins, Stingers, and rifles. At the time, it seemed like a huge risk. No one knew how Putin would respond. One senior official recalled thinking, “If Russia moved 350 million dollars’ worth of American-troop-killing equipment into Iraq or to the Taliban, would we just lie down and take it?” The question was rhetorical. The answer was obvious. But as the war dragged on, the administration kept testing Putin at each turn, cranking up the heat and then checking in on the psychological state of the frog. Biden often said—in public, and in private to his staff—that he had two goals: to liberate Ukraine and to avoid direct conflict between American and Russian forces. But increasingly, he was finding those goals to be in some tension, particularly as different theories emerged about what Ukraine most needed, and how fast.
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
Over the next year, a pattern emerged. Ukraine’s request for a specific type of arms would at first get a frosty reception in Washington, perhaps an outright no, a one-word answer Biden delivered himself to reporters who asked about sending the F-16s, which could strike Moscow. After saying absolutely not, the Biden White House would then say it was “studying” each request, trying to line up Ukraine’s capabilities with weapons that could do the job. Situation Room meetings would be devoted to the question of whether a specific weapon was truly “escalatory.” Leaks to the press assured that the debate played out in public, creating new pressures. And then, as Biden discovered that Russia’s “red lines” were not as bright as first feared, he would relent, noting that Ukraine’s defense demands had changed—from defending Kyiv to defending vast sections of Ukraine’s industrial east. Eventually, a commitment to deliver weapons previously off-limits would follow. At one point, Zelensky’s representatives argued that the cycle from “no” to “studying it” to “yes” was so well trod that the United States could save itself a lot of time and money by just saying yes from the get-go—or at least begin training Ukrainians on how to fly an F-16 or drive an Abrams tank months before actually agreeing to send the weapons. It would save time, the advisor said to me, “and maybe scare the shit out of the Russians.
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
Biden laid out two goals, in tension with each other: Do everything you can to help Ukraine, and don’t get sucked into World War III.
”
”
David E. Sanger (New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West)
“
Absolutely typical day!
Yes! Putin is bombing Ukraine from his bomb shelter. Zelensky withdrew several million dollars from his bomb shelter.... They changed Biden's diapers. Everything is fine!
”
”
Росен Марков
“
On September 1, Sondland made it clear to the Ukrainians that unless they made an explicit promise to pursue the Burisma investigation—into the alleged ties between Joe Biden’s son Hunter and the energy company Burisma in Ukraine—the funds would not be released. That same day, Taylor told Kent that Sondland had been as explicit in his communications with the Ukrainians as to say that Trump wanted Zelenskyy at a microphone voicing the words “investigations,” “Biden,” and “Clinton.” The Washington Post would report the shakedown attempt four days later, on September 5. Still, Sondland kept pressuring the government of Ukraine. Taylor confronted Sondland, saying: “I think it’s crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a political campaign.
”
”
David Rothkopf (American Resistance: The Inside Story of How the Deep State Saved the Nation)
“
That left one last task before they could tell the world about their deal. Manchin, who now had his own case of COVID, needed Biden’s formal endorsement of their agreement. All along, Manchin was convinced that the White House was going to hate provisions in the deal expanding oil and gas leases. But many in the White House, like Brian Deese, were perfectly comfortable with what Manchin wanted. Given the conflict in Ukraine and the spike in energy prices, they were happy to expand domestic production of energy. It was politically expedient, at the very least—and might help lower prices in the middle of a crisis. When Biden came on the line and greeted Manchin, he purred, “Joe-Joe!” After nine months of emotionally exhausting back-and-forth, they were done.
”
”
Franklin Foer (The Last Politician: Inside Joe Biden's White House and the Struggle for America's Future)
“
Schumer was too anxious to revel in his first victory. He needed to see Nancy Pelosi, to let her know about his deal with Manchin. A year earlier, Pelosi felt blindsided by Schumer when he failed to tell her about how he signed a surreptitious agreement with the West Virginia senator. Now, he was ready to spring a much happier surprise on her, although he wasn’t sure how she would respond to Manchin’s demands, which he worried might irk Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and her comrades on the Left. But Schumer couldn’t relay his revelation to Pelosi, because he couldn’t reach her. She was in a secure room in the basement of the Capitol, receiving a briefing on Ukraine, without access to a cell phone. When she finally emerged, Schumer trekked to her office. It came as an enormous relief that she didn’t think twice about agreeing to Schumer’s side deals with Manchin. Schumer asked her to call the West Virginia senator to relay her assent.
”
”
Franklin Foer (The Last Politician: Inside Joe Biden's White House and the Struggle for America's Future)
“
That’s why tomorrow I’m going to send to Congress an urgent budget request to fund America’s national security needs, to support our critical partners, including Israel and Ukraine. It’s a smart investment that’s going pay dividends for American security for generations, help us keep American troops out of harm’s way, help us build a world that is safer, more peaceful and more prosperous for our children and grandchildren.
”
”
Joe Biden
“
those who believe in facts and logic will quickly discover that the United States and its Allies are mainly responsible for this trainwreck. the April 2008 decision to bring Ukraine and Georgia into Nato was destined to lead to conflict with Russia. the Bush administration was the principal architect of that fateful choice, but the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have doubled down on that policy at every turn...
”
”
John J. Mearsheimer
“
It was notable, in light of subsequent defenses of Trump’s behavior on the call, that he made only two demands of Ukraine: to investigate CrowdStrike and the Bidens. Trump said nothing about the need for Zelensky to fight corruption in Ukraine or to defend his country against Russia. All Trump cared about was extorting this vulnerable nation for his personal electoral advantage.
”
”
Jeffrey Toobin (True Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Investigation of Donald Trump)
“
On Monday, July 22, Giuliani, Volker, and Yermak had a three-way call for thirty-eight minutes where Giuliani received assurance from Yermak that Zelensky understood what was expected of him in a phone call with Trump. The investigation of the Bidens—not burden sharing with the West, not corruption in Ukraine, not saving lives from Russian bullets and bombs—was all that mattered.
”
”
Jeffrey Toobin (True Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Investigation of Donald Trump)
“
By the time Biden became president in 2021, he firmly believed that unless the United States was attacked, sending U.S. troops to solve foreign policy problems had not served the interest of the United States. From Vietnam through Afghanistan and Iraq the troop bandage had failed.
One of the most important days for President Biden's presidency was December 8, 2021 -- months before Russia invades Ukraine -- when he sat in the Oval Office alone with Jake Sullivan and said, "I'm not sending U.S. troops to Ukraine." He then announced it publicly.
"That is not on the table," he said as he walked across the White House lawn to Marine One, setting the direction of a new foreign policy.
When the war came and Russia invaded, Biden stuck to his word. Th U.S. provided massive intelligence support and billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine. He provided moral support and condemned Russia's invasion. He deployed more U.S. forces to Europe and continued to pledge Article 5 protection to NATO allies if they were attacked. He mobilized NATO -- the strongest military alliance in the world -- to back Ukraine without sending troops into Ukraine. . . .
"Joe Biden is the first president in the 21st century who can say I don't have American soldiers in war," Sullivan said. "Yes, there are wars. We're not fighting them.
”
”
Bob Woodward (War)
“
The findings were—and still are today—alarming. Based on the USTR report and research on technology transfers and intellectual property, Trump further restricted Chinese access to investment in the high-tech sector. In response, China retaliated with its own tariffs, and accused the United States government both of triggering the trade war and trying to slow China’s growth. This makes the continuation of the decoupling policy during Joe Biden’s administration all the more surprising. United States rhetoric and diplomacy have become milder and more authoritative, but their strategic substance in this area is strikingly similar to Biden’s predecessor: Punitive tariffs against China have remained almost unchanged. Biden even stepped up the pace slightly by compiling a blacklist of sixty Chinese companies in 2020—which he has continuously updated since then—that United States firms may no longer do business with. Shortly afterward, the United States joined the EU, Canada, and the UK in imposing sanctions on Chinese officials in connection with human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States called on China to condemn the attack. China in turn blamed the United States for the war. A few weeks later, in May 2022, Chinese authorities and state-affiliated companies were told to replace American-made computers with domestic brands. Around fifty million computers were affected.
”
”
Mathias Döpfner (Dealings with Dictators: A CEO's Guide to Defending Democracy)