Asset Forfeiture Quotes

Drug-war forfeiture laws are frequently used to allow those with assets to buy their freedom, while drug users and small-time dealers with few assets to trade are subjected to lengthy prison terms.

Civil asset forfeiture was originally intended as a way to cripple organized crime through the seizure of property used in a criminal enterprise. Regrettably, it has become a tool for unscrupulous law enforcement officials, acting without due process, to profit by destroying the livelihood of innocent individuals, many of whom never recover the lawful assets taken from them. When the rights of the innocent can be so easily violated, no one’s rights are safe. We call on Congress and state legislatures to enact reforms to protect law-abiding citizens against abusive asset forfeiture tactics.

Americans lose more of their property to civil asset forfeiture than they do to criminals.

Oddly, someone who has actually been charged with a crime is entitled to the appointment of counsel in civil forfeiture proceedings, but those whose property has been forfeited but whose conduct did not merit criminal charges are on their own. This helps to explain why up to 90 percent of forfeiture cases in some jurisdictions are not challenged. Most people simply cannot afford the considerable cost of hiring an attorney. Even if the cost is not an issue, the incentives are all wrong. If the police seized your car worth $5,000, or took $500 cash from your home, would you be willing to pay an attorney more than your assets are worth to get them back? If you haven't been charged with a crime, are you willing to risk the possibility that fighting the forfeiture might prompt the government to file criminal charges against you?

But it was not until q984, she Congress amended the federal law to allow federal law enforcement agencies to retain and use any and all proceeds from asset forfeiture, andmtl allow state and local police agencies to retain up to 80 percent of the asserts value, that a true revolution began.

It was the deployment of British soldiers to colonial cities strictly for the purpose of enforcing the law that set long-smoldering hostilities aflame. Using general warrants, British soldiers were allowed to enter private homes, confiscate what they found, and often keep the bounty for themselves. The policy was reminiscent of today’s civil asset forfeiture laws, which allow police to seize and keep for their departments cash, cars, luxury goods, and even homes, often under only the thinnest allegation of criminality.

But it was not until 1984, when Congress amended the federal law to allow federal law enforcement agencies to retain and use any and all proceeds from asset forfeitures, and to allow state and local police agencies to retain up to 80 percent of the assets’ value, that a true revolution occurred. Suddenly, police departments were capable of increasing the size of their budgets, quite substantially, simply by taking the cash, cars, and homes of people suspected of drug use or sales.

In 2000, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, which was meant to address many of the egregious examples of abuse of civil forfeiture.

Using general warrants, British soldiers were allowed to enter private homes, confiscate what they found, and often keep the bounty for themselves. The policy was reminiscent of today’s civil asset forfeiture laws,

Canada is a preferred destination to launder ill-gotten gains with impunity. Numerous investigations that ultimately went nowhere have revealed weak legislation and an under-resourced enforcement regime that is manifestly not fit for purpose. Chances of getting caught are almost nil, civil and criminal asset forfeiture is weak, and penalties are negligible.

Under a Louisiana drug-forfeiture law, citizens who had their assets seized - and were uncharged - bore the burden of both proving their innocence and having to pay the highest bond in the nation (10 percent of the value of the property or $2500, whichever was greater) to sue for their return. Perversely, the 1989 law insured that forfeited assets were distributed in a manner that invited corruption. Sixty percent of the proceeds went to the law enforcement agency that seized the property, 20 percent to the district attorney, and 20 percent to a state judges' judicial-expense fund.