Admiral Yamamoto Quotes

As night fell, Yamamoto, aboard the huge battleship Yamato, steamed eastward at full speed into the night. Far ahead the destroyers went to flank speed to search for the US carriers. Lookouts, with the best night-vision binoculars in the world, swept the night horizon where the very dark sky meets the black ocean. The faintest shape, the tiniest pinprick of light, would show there was something out there, like the superstructure of a ship over the horizon. There was nothing.

Yamamoto was considered, both in Japan and the United States, as intelligent, capable, aggressive, and dangerous. Motivated by his skill as a poker player and casino gambler, he was continually calculating odds on an endless variety of options. He played bridge and chess better than most good players. Like most powerful leaders he was articulate and persuasive, and once in a position of power he pushed his agenda relentlessly. Whether he would push his odds successfully in the Pacific remained to be seen.

Yamamoto sensed a feeling of culmination about the huge success of the first strike, and the same incisive intuition that guided his brilliant moves at the gaming tables told him what the next move on the bridge of Akagi would be. In (Vice Admiral) Nagumo he knew his man. Nagumo had never been committed to the Pearl Harbor mission. He had not been Yamamoto’s choice to command the Striking Force; his assignment was the decision of the Navy Ministry in Tokyo, based on seniority. While the exultation of the officers and sailors on his staff swirled around him, Yamamoto sat quietly. Finally, he fixed a steely gaze on his chief of staff, and in a low, intense voice: “Admiral Nagumo is going to withdraw.

You cannot invade the mainland United States. There would be a rifle behind every blade of grass.

Learning is a good thing, but more often it leads to mistakes. It is like the admonition of the priest Konan. It is worthwhile just looking at the deeds of accomplished persons for the purpose of knowing our own insufficiencies. But often this does not happen. For the most part, we admire our own opinions and become fond of arguing.

There was a man who said, "Such and such a person has a violent disposition, but this is what I said right to his face… This was an unbecoming thing to say, and it was said simply because he wanted to be known as a rough fellow. It was rather low, and it can be seen that he was still rather immature. It is because a samurai has correct manners that he is admired. Speaking of other people in this way is no different from an exchange between low class spearmen. It is vulgar.

In all, Yamamoto deployed 162 ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, practically its entire fighting force, in support of the Midway operation. (No

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was not in favor of war and was under no illusion that Japan had the ability and the resources to outlast the US or Britain.

The warships below were tossed up into the air like bathtub toys. The Japanese battleship Nagato, formerly the flagship of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the man responsible for planning the attack on Pearl Harbor, was thrown four hundred yards.

All I propose is an attack that will paralyze the Americans, for perhaps six months. This attack is not about victory, about winning a war...It is about delaying them, keeping them back, damaging their military might and pride. -Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

Hiroyuki Agawa describes a meeting in which an army officer seated next to the admiral rose to his feet “and began to harangue those assembled at interminable length.” Yamamoto stealthily edged the man’s chair back several feet. When he had finished speaking and tried to sit down, the officer missed the chair and fell sprawling on the floor. The admiral kept a straight face, looked straight ahead, and continued the meeting as if nothing had happened.

Battle of Midway Midway is an island that lies northwest of Hawaii. In early June of 1942, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

the end of 1939, Japan’s oil stocks had stood at fifty-five million barrels, enough to fight for eighteen months. Sixty percent of oil imports came from the United States. Japan’s islands produced only twelve percent of the iron ore needed; the rest came from Manchuria with its hostile Russian neighbor. But the Japanese military remained split between those favoring a strike north against the hated Communist Soviet Union or south to grab the resources of Southeast Asia. The United States fleet remained an obstacle to both strategies. The navy stuck to its war plan of an ambush of the U.S. fleet in home waters. That way Japanese gunships could carry more guns and less fuel. But carrier admirals such as Yamamoto would need more oil to fuel far-striking carriers and their planes. The hawks itched for action in either direction. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo disclosed his strategy to a dovish colleague, Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, who believed Japan should adhere to its Naval Treaty obligations. “You’re a fool,” chided Nagumo. “I thrust with a dagger up under the ribs, and that would be it. . . .” Germany’s surprise invasion of the Soviet Union June 22, 1941, put blood in the water. Yosuke Matsuoka, now foreign minister, counseled: “When Germany wipes out the Soviet Union, we can’t simply share in the spoils of victory unless we have done something. We must either shed our blood or embark on diplomacy. It’s better to shed blood.

On December 2 this sort of bull session ended abruptly. The day before, the imperial council had decided on war, and now Admiral Yamamoto radioed the task force: “Climb Mount Niitaka.” It was code for “Proceed with the attack.” Another message later that day confirmed the date: “X-Day will be 8 December” — which was, of course, Sunday, December 7, in Hawaii.

No one was more aware of what a gamble kido butai was than its brilliant creator, Admiral Isoroku Yamamato. He had no illusions about Japan’s chances in a war with the industrial power of the West. But his patriotism, his intellect, his love of gambling had all been challenged. If his more headstrong colleagues must go to war, and if they intended to do so by seizing the oil of Dutch Indonesia and rubber of British Malaya, then the only way to succeed was by neutralizing the might of the U.S. Navy on the Japanese flank. And the only way to do that was by surprise. It was, as it turned out, a grave miscalculation, one that Yamamoto did not live to see realized. Commander Kikuichi Fujita of the cruiser Tone foresaw the consequences graphically: “I think this sortie is going to be like going into a tiger’s lair to get her cubs.

Harvard educated Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who was named Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet in August 1939, came to see naval air power as a great equalizer. At first, he was against waging a war against the United States, knowing her people well. He had the firm belief that Japan was not able to win a war in any ordinary manner. He concluded that Japan must have a new air strategy that would demoralize not only the US Navy, but also the American people. He also believed that by destroying the American fleet that the US government would agree to let Japan rule the Pacific. As part of high command, the Naval Headquarters turned down the plan due to its high danger and risks. Yamamoto argued, stating, “Japan will certainly be beaten if we wage war, force to force. There is nothing we can do but crush their fighting spirit. I will resign from this post if my plan cannot be approved.” The chief of naval operations finally relented saying, “As Yamamoto will go that far, we will have to let him do it.” Japan’s

Hiroyuki Agawa describes a meeting in which an army officer seated next to the admiral rose to his feet “and began to harangue those assembled at interminable length.” Yamamoto stealthily edged the man’s chair back several feet. When he had finished speaking and tried to sit down, the officer missed the chair and fell sprawling on the floor. The admiral kept a straight face, looked straight ahead, and continued the meeting as if nothing had happened

The Americans even exacted their revenge for Pearl Harbor in April 1943, when cryptanalysts learned that Admiral Yamamoto, who had planned the deadly attack, was due to make a visit to the island of Bougainville, near New Guinea. American fighters, waiting in ambush, came out of the clouds and sent the admiral down in flames to his death in the jungle below.